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INTRODUCTION
In 1971, the International Court of Justice in The Hague
(“the Court” or “ICJ”) heard arguments in an Advisory
Opinion regarding the legal status of Namibia (South-West
Africa).1 At the crux of the issue was whether South Africa
was legally permitted to occupy the territory of Namibia, and
relatedly, whether the people of Namibia enjoyed the right to
self-determination. In the course of the proceedings, the
Court heard statements by South Africa, a number of other
African states, and the Organization of African Unity. No
representative of the people of Namibia was present, nor was
any invited to address the tribunal in defense of the position
of the people of Namibia in a case that would likely impact
their standing in the international community. In contrast,
in 2010, when the Court heard arguments in the Advisory
Opinion regarding the legal status of Kosovo, the Peace
Palace witnessed a dramatically different scene. There, the
UN General Assembly asked the Court to determine whether
the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo was in
accordance with international law. Similar to the Namibia
advisory opinion, the Court was asked to opine on a matter
that affected the rights of a people seeking to exercise the
right to self-determination in pursuit of national
independence. Yet in the Kosovo opinion, the Court invited
the Authors of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo to
address the Court. Further, it granted Kosovo three hours to
present evidence and convey legal arguments, thereby
allowing the representatives of Kosovo a seat at the table,
literally, across from the representatives of Serbia from
whom they sought independence.
The choice to exclude Namibia—a non-state actor
(“NSA”)—from ICJ proceedings startled no one; the statute
of the Court offers no means for an NSA to participate in
proceedings of an advisory opinion, even if those proceedings
substantially affect the rights of that NSA. The Statute of the
ICJ did not change between 1971 and 2010, yet, the Court’s
procedural allowances reveal a dramatic shift with regard to
1. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 13 (June 21).
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the Court’s view of the proper role of actors such as Namibia,
Kosovo and other “aspiring states” at the ICJ.
I introduce the term “aspiring states” to describe NSAs
within these groundbreaking advisory opinions, referring to
a sub-group of NSAs who do not meet the legal criteria for
statehood, yet who aspire to do so, such as Palestine and
Kosovo. These actors are territorial entities that may be
under the governance of sovereign nations or the United
Nations, but which are not UN members. They aspire to
exercise their right to self-determination and to establish
separate, independent states, free from the control of their
parent nations. Aspiring states, though often characterized
as NSAs by scholars and jurists due to their lack of
membership in the club of statehood, in actuality share more
similarities with states than they do with other NSAs such
as NGOs or multi-national corporations.
With this Article, I propose that the ICJ’s treatment of
aspiring states offers a critical signal that the Court’s
jurisprudence—and international law more broadly—is
evolving from its state-centric origins, evidenced by its
increased willingness to legitimate the right to selfdetermination of peoples. Is it simple coincidence that at a
Court where standing relies upon statehood, the Court has
allowed participation by the very non-state entities aspiring
to achieve statehood? By permitting aspiring states to appear
before it, the Court positions them to have a voice, to submit
pleadings, and in effect, positions them—procedurally—
similarly to State parties in contentious cases. The judges’
procedural determination to allow non-state participation in
these very limited circumstances, though largely overlooked
by scholars and sometimes by the judges themselves,2 is
significant. NSA participation is critical to understanding
the substance of decisions regarding the right to selfdetermination, a right that is at the crux of each of these
matters, and which entitles certain peoples to be free from
2. While clerking at the ICJ from 2009–2010, I had conversations with judges
who indicated that participation of non-state actors, such as the representatives
of Kosovo in the Kosovo advisory opinion, was “fair,” though there was no statutebased reason to allow it. While I do not dispute the importance of “fairness” in
judicial proceedings, the evolution of the Court’s attitude toward the inclusion of
aspiring states is remarkable considering the statutory restrictions, and merits
further exploration.
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persecution and discrimination, and to collectively determine
their political future in a democratic fashion. Not only does
this phenomenon shed new light on the ever-elusive legal
concept of self-determination, but it also offers important
indicators of the ways in which the Court has evolved over
decades, from a state-centric approach to international law,
to one that is more encompassing of the current international
legal order.
The ICJ is perhaps the grande dame of an international
legal system rooted in a state-centric approach to
international law. The ICJ, or World Court, draws its
authority from the UN charter, as the “principal judicial
organ” of the United Nations.3 It enjoys general jurisdictional
reach, and it “remains the most prestigious legal decisionmaker within the system.”4 Because of its explicit connection
to the United Nations and its reliance on state parties to
support its judicial function, the Court has consistently been
attentive to the legal position of states. Indeed, for centuries,
legal scholars considered states to be the only relevant actors
within the international legal scene. This state-centric
approach to international law is perhaps most embodied by
the law and practice of the ICJ, where only states (and
occasionally international organizations) have the capacity to
engage with the Court.
Yet international law is arguably no longer dominated
exclusively by a state-centric approach. Non-state actors,
including international organizations, NGOs, multi-national
corporations, and other actors not contemplated by the
drafters of many foundational international legal
instruments play a significant role in today’s changing legal
environment. The increased relevance of NSAs within
international law has created tension for the ICJ; if NSAs are
barred from participation in proceedings, they must be
represented by states if their rights are to be reflected in the
3. D.W. Bowett, The Court’s Role in Relation to International Organizations,
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 181, 186 (Vaughan Lowe
& Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
4. Maurice Mendelson, The International Court of Justice and the Sources of
International Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 63,
82-83, 88 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
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proceedings. Phenomena such as the rise of human rights,
anti-colonialism, and increased participation of NSAs in
international law demonstrate that numerous affinity groups
may not be best represented by the nation-state.5 Take for
example, a minority group who seeks to realize its right to
self-determination, such as the Palestinian people. Although
for years they may have been formally represented by Israel
in international judicial fora, it is improbable that Israel
would have brought a claim representing the rights of the
Palestinian people, since it would necessarily be brought
against the state’s own interest. When considering the right
to self-determination of aspiring states, it is unlikely that the
state from which an NSA seeks to secede will represent its
interests at the ICJ. This tension raises significant concerns
regarding the legitimacy of the ICJ, a court meant to have
universal jurisdiction, but where such groups’ interests have
no potential for representation.
The legitimacy of any judicial body is undermined when
it adjudicates the rights and obligations of actors who are not
parties to a dispute. In particular, the right to selfdetermination has been adjudicated at the court vis-à-vis a
number of important advisory opinions in which NSAs’ rights
have been at the heart of the dispute. According to the Rules
of the Court, NSAs have no right to appear before the ICJ.
Yet in a number of instances, the Court has seen fit to include
their voices in proceedings. Thus, I argue that although the
ICJ may be a bastion of the state-centered approach to
international law, the Court—overtly in its procedure and
subtly in the substance of its jurisprudence—has
acknowledged and grappled with this paradox of modern
international law.
Rich discussions abound regarding the role of non-state
actors at the ICJ. Scholars have analyzed the treatment of
human rights by the ICJ. Others still have lamented the lack
of the Court’s capacity to discuss self-determination and its
insistence on evading this thorny issue. This Article engages
these discussions by explicitly linking aspiring states’
5. See Karen Knop, Why Rethinking the Sovereign State is Important for
Women’s International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 154-57 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
2011).
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procedural positioning at the ICJ with substantive findings
regarding their right to self-determination at the heart of
these cases. In the course of this Article, I offer a descriptive
account of a fascinating procedural story, describing the
three instances in which the ICJ has created the procedural
space to allow aspiring state actors a role at the Court
through the advisory opinion mechanism. I propose that the
Court’s ruptures with statute-based procedure in the
aspiring state cases can be understood through applying a
legitimacy framework. Although legitimacy pulls the Court
in multiple directions, I propose that a legitimacy analysis
rooted in democratic theory explains the Court’s favorable
procedural treatment of aspiring states who are nearing
international recognition as independent entities. Finally, I
explore the normative implications of these procedural
choices on the Court’s substantive analysis of the balance
between a people’s right to self-determination and a state’s
right to sovereignty, which sheds new light on the Court’s
jurisprudence concerning the controversial and muchcontested right of self-determination.
Understanding the inclusion or exclusion of aspiring
states within the international legal system is important on
multiple levels. Aspiring states have landed at the epicenter
of a variety of international law conflicts, and will likely
continue to do so. From a practice and procedure perspective,
it is crucial that we understand what the Court is doing here
with regard to its procedure. Is there an incongruity between
the Court’s procedure and substance? What does this
procedural rupture tell us about the value judgments and
choices that the Court is making? Second, from a legitimacy
perspective, the ICJ should not be perceived as determining
the rights of actors who have no basis for participation, which
undermines procedural fairness and democratic principles of
law. Lastly, this query is important to the extent that it may
assist legal scholars in interpreting the ICJ’s approach to
NSAs and self-determination, an area of the law in which it
has been reticent to take an assertive position. I explain that
although the Court is not yet ready to create positive law
regarding the right to self-determination, procedure does
allow the Court to make concessions to the new world in
which it is adjudicating, a world in which the interests of
states are no longer necessarily dominant over those of
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individuals or groups. That new world is one in which the
right to self-determination, in certain circumstances, can and
must be effectuated at the ICJ, despite the challenge to
statehood that it may pose.
This Article provides a novel observation regarding
procedure at the ICJ: the ICJ is carving out a role for certain
aspiring states where none previously existed. This
contribution, in and of itself, is crucial in that it signals a
change in the Court’s practice that is different from that
contemplated by its statute and quite distinct from decades
of established practice. But, as is often the case, procedural
shifts may correlate with substantive shifts in the
interpretation of the law. I argue that this trend is indicative
of larger phenomena in international law, specifically that
the Court’s procedural treatment of aspiring states reflects
its increased willingness to engage with the balance between
the right to self-determination and the right to territorial
sovereignty. Despite the Court’s reticence to create positive
law on the issue of self-determination, these opinions reflect
the Court’s longstanding concern for ensuring that its
judgments are considered fair and legitimate by state actors
and non-state actors alike. This procedural treatment
suggests a more favorable, legitimating approach to aspiring
states and their right to self-determination. Thus, these
procedural allowances permit the Court to continue to
operate with a state-centered approach, while maintaining
its legitimacy within an international legal regime that is
increasingly dominated by NSAs, and where the right to selfdetermination still remains elusive for many.
In making this argument, this Article proceeds in four
Parts. Part I describes the historically orthodox view of
international law in which states were the only relevant
actors, and in which NSAs have been marginalized. This
perspective lays the groundwork for understanding why the
participation of non-state actors at the Court has
traditionally been curtailed. Part II focuses on the ICJ and
the specific statutory elements that regulate the
participation of actors before the Court. Statutory limitations
explicitly limit the capacity of NSAs to participate within the
Court’s procedure, which is why it is so remarkable that on
three occasions, the Court has allowed aspiring states to
participate. In order to evaluate to what extent these
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anomalies are linked to a shift in the Court’s substantive
evaluation of the right to self-determination, this Part also
reviews the limited analysis of self-determination at the
Court—the human right that is of utmost importance to
aspiring states. This right is one of the most commonly
referenced and codified within international law, yet very few
courts have made efforts to clarify the scope or definition of
this right, including the ICJ. Part III identifies the
jurisprudence at the ICJ pertaining to aspiring states. I first
explain why it is rare, considering the procedural restrictions
within the statute, for NSAs to find a role at the Court, and
then I describe three instances during which the Court and
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“PCIJ”), have allowed aspiring states access to the ICJ. I
examine commonalities between these instances and
summarize the explanations for how the Court rationalizes
this allowance, despite the lack of procedural mechanisms
sanctioning such acts.
Part IV moves from the how to the why. Why would a
Court that is state-centered and reliant on a constituency of
states within the international system take pains to include,
even marginally, the perspectives of aspiring state actors? In
answering this question, I propose that this procedural move
is a legitimacy enhancing choice for the Court. I explore how
normative legitimacy theory contextualizes the Court’s
adoption of this procedurally odd position with regard to
aspiring states. Legitimacy theory, in multiple variants,
offers a perspective on how and why international courts
maintain their legitimacy in the international realm.
Aspiring states pose an existential challenge to the
legitimacy of the ICJ. On the one hand, courts such as the
ICJ must consider their mandate-providers, their
constituency, and their state parties, which may lead the
Court to retain its state-centered position and its reticence to
develop radically positive law regarding self-determination.
On the other hand, the ICJ’s legitimacy may be affected by
perceptions of the Court as operating in accordance with
values such as fairness and justice, which, I argue, has
resulted in the Court’s decisions to engage with aspiring
states through the adoption of unorthodox procedural
choices.
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Of course, participation in proceedings at the Peace
Palace also significantly affects the legitimacy of aspiring
states themselves in their quest toward statehood. This
Article concludes by exploring the normative implications of
these trends on the right to self-determination and
sovereignty. I conclude that the Court’s procedural
allowances are reflective of a court that is grappling with its
role within a changing international legal framework, in
which states are no longer exclusively dominant. This finding
has important conclusions for aspiring states in conflicts
across the globe, and implications for the ICJ as it
adjudicates and has the potential to legitimize the desires for
the independence of aspiring states.
I. STATE-CENTERED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NON-STATE
ACTORS
The orthodox view remains that the state is the only
relevant unit in the conduct of international relations.6 This
perspective has dominated international law since its early
days, “[s]ince . . . the Law of Nations is a law between States
only and exclusively, States only and exclusively are the
subject of the Law of Nations.”7 The “states-only” view of
international law reflects the world-picture of international
law at the time the Court was created in the 1920s. Then, the
international community was referred to as a “Lotus
Society,”8 a reference to the famous Lotus Decision of the
PCIJ reaffirming that international law “governs relations
6. Gleider I. Hernandez, Non-State Actors From the Perspective of the
International Court of Justice, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
140, 140 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011) [hereinafter MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES].
7. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 456 (Ronald F. Roxburgh
ed., 3d ed. 2008); see also Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public
International Law, in 2 RECUEIL DE COURS 1, 138 (1962) (quoting DIONISIO
ANZILOTTI, IL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE NEI GIUDIZI INTERNI 44 (1905)) (“[I]t is
inconceivable that there should exist subjects of international rights and duties
other than [s]tates.”).
8. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unite de L’Ordre Juridique International, in 297
RECUEIL DE COURS : COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 93 (2002).
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between independent States” anchored in notions of state
sovereignty.9
Yet a number of trends have emerged since the rise of the
United Nations that have challenged the exclusive
dominance of state sovereignty within international law.
These trends include, most prominently, the rise of an anticolonialist movement and an increased awareness,
codification, and enforcement of human rights norms.
Inherent in these phenomena is the recognition that a state
may not always be the best representative of the interests of
the individuals and groups that it represents.10 This becomes
particularly clear when individuals and groups make claims
against states for violations of their rights. As a result of
these developments, non-state actors have come to play an
increasingly significant role within international law,
challenging what had for centuries been a state-exclusive
domain.11
Scholars have employed the umbrella term “non-state
actors” to reference a variety of potential actors who cannot
be defined as states within international law, such as:
international
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations, corporations, minority groups, terrorist
groups, individuals, armed groups, and groups that aspire to
become states, or pre-state territorial entities.12 The term is
often utilized as a catchall to describe a variety of actors in
very different circumstances, and with varying degrees of
capacity to affect change within the international legal
system. It has also been subject to critique by prominent
9. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7).
10. See generally Cedric Ryngaert & Math Noorthmann, New Actors in Global
Governance and International Human Rights Law, 4 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL
DISCOURSE 5 (2010) (discussing the role of non-state actors in international
relations).
11. See NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005);
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 491-94 (2006). See generally NON-STATE
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009); MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6.
12. Ryngaert & Noorthmann, supra note 10, at 6.
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scholars including Philip Alston, who has levied the concern
that the umbrella term obfuscates any debate about status
through the insistence on defining an actor by what it is not,
rather than what it is. This approach “combines impeccable
purism in terms of traditional international legal analysis
with an unparalleled capacity to marginalize a significant
part of the international human rights regime from the most
vital challenges confronting global governance at the dawn of
the twenty-first century.”13 Thus, the term NSA, though often
utilized to acknowledge these entities’ increased role in
international law, may only serve to reinforce a state-centric
approach within the field.
The process of how a “state” comes to exist is contested
among legal scholars. As a starting point, the Montevideo
Convention of 1933 discusses the criteria and requirements
of statehood. It is widely understood as the codification of
customary law, indicating that four criteria must be met as
requirements for statehood.14 An entity must meet the
following requirements in ordered to be considered a state: it
must have a stable population, the ability to engage in
relations with other states, set borders, and an effective
governmental power. Although these four criteria are
relatively undisputed, debate still remains as to whether
these criteria are sufficient to become a state, or whether a
state must also be recognized as such by the international

13. Philip Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). Alston’s eighteen-month-old
daughter came up with the term “not-a-cat” to describe any animal she saw that
was not a cat, whether it was a mouse, kangaroo, et cetera. Alston’s critique
borrows from his daughter’s methodology of naming something not by the
characteristics that define it, but by those to which it is in opposition. Id.
14. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (“The state
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with other states.”); see, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 36-47 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed., 2006)
(discussing the four accepted criteria before exploring other proposed state
characteristics, such as independence and sovereignty).
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community.15 The Montevideo Convention rejects the
inclusion of recognition as a criteria, stating that, “[t]he
political existence of the state is independent of recognition
by the other states.”16
The Montevideo Convention represents only one of two
central theories within international law regarding state
recognition: the declaratory theory. The declaratory theory of
state recognition simply requires that a state be able to meet
the four criteria laid out by the convention, and “looks to the
purported state’s assertion of its sovereignty within the
territory it exclusively controls to determine if it can access
the international plane.”17 State recognition is irrelevant. The
constitutive theory, on the other hand, places great emphasis
on recognition by other states, determining that only upon
recognition by other states can a new state come to exist
legally. Although the declaratory view is regarded as the
more prominent approach, some scholars have identified the
ambivalence of authorities that articulate support of the
declaratory view, but then appear to apply a constitutive
approach to balance complicated political tensions that
invariably arise when a new state declares itself.18 Although
states have always been dominant actors within
international law, how exactly they come to exist remains in
dispute.
This Article focuses its attention on one sub-group of
NSAs who do not meet the legal criteria for statehood, yet
who aspire to do so. In this Article, I utilize the term “aspiring
states” to describe particular NSAs: those territorial entities,
which, although they are technically governed by a sovereign
15. For a canvassing of the various scholarly opinions regarding whether state
recognition is crucial for an entity to be considered a state, see William Thomas
Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State Recognition
Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 119-43 (2009).
16. Montevideo Convention, supra note 14, at arts. 3, 6.
17. Worster, supra note 15, at 119.
18. Id. at 118, 125-27. Worster discusses this ambivalence as particularly
evident within the opinions of the Badinter Commission, set up by the European
Economic Community to assess the status of the states constituting the former
Yugoslavia, and the Commission’s need to balance the desires of the European
nations. Id. at 125-27.
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nation, aspire to exercise their right to self-determination
and to establish separate, independent states.19 Examples of
aspiring state actors include (in the Court’s recent history)
representatives from Palestine and Kosovo; entities that
have declared their independence but are not universally
recognized as states.
Drawing on Alston’s critique, I propose the term
“aspiring states” to identify a sub-group of NSAs that is more
nuanced, descriptive, and more limited than NSAs. This term
defines these actors by their commonalities, and not only by
their lack of membership in the club of statehood. Aspiring
states can be defined in that they meet two of the four socalled Montevideo criteria: they can claim (a) a permanent
population and (b) a defined territory. Yet, they are
“aspiring” because at the time of their intervention at the
ICJ, they do not fully meet the other criteria: (c) a
government with effective control and (d) capacity to enter
into relations with other states. These two criteria are
(temporarily) unreachable for aspiring states because,
significantly, these entities are governed under international
supervision as they seek to exercise their right to selfdetermination through secession, or because they have not
been widely recognized by other nations. These actors,
however similar they may be to states, are not states. As a
result, aspiring states, according to the statute of the ICJ,
should be barred from participation in all adjudication at the
ICJ. Curiously, however, the Court has managed to create a
space for these non-state actors to access the procedure of the
Court.
The increased importance of NSAs within the
international scene have led some to conclude that the statecentric system of international relations is endangered
19. Andrew Clapham correctly points out the awkwardness of referring to
these groups, whom he refers to as national-liberation movements (“NLMs”).
NLMs, he highlights, may reject the NSA label as they “may . . . wish to stress
their putative state-like aspirations and status, [but] they may sometimes already
be recognized as a state member in certain regional intergovernmental
organizations.” Clapham, supra note 11, at 494; see also Hernandez, supra note
6, at 140, 147-49 (analyzing the role that NSAs have played in the jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice, and referring to these groups as “entit[ies]
striving toward statehood”).
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irrevocably, jeopardizing the dominance of the sovereign
state.20 Some scholars have argued that NSAs have
engendered such a radical shift within the international legal
order that it has been dramatically transformed from its
origins as the law of nations.21 Couched within those debates,
this Article seeks to tackle the much more precise issue of the
role of aspiring states at the ICJ. It is an issue that has broad
implications and intersects with these larger questions about
whether international law has fundamentally shifted away
from its state-based foundations.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND NON-STATE ACTORS
The ICJ, known as the World Court, is the principal
judicial body of the United Nations. Consideration of the ICJ
in its historical context reveals the degree to which the
international juridical function was embedded within the
broader institutional framework of the United Nations.22
State representatives at the Hague Peace Conference who
founded the ICJ’s predecessor judicial body, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, envisioned a judicial body that
would adjudicate inter-state legal disputes. The transition
from the PCIJ to the ICJ in 1946 was largely seamless, and
20. Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Its
Limitations, 9 RATIO JURIS 125, 135-36 (1996); Martti Koskenniemi, The Future
of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 397, 406-10 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The Decline
of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 7-8 (1998); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign
State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447,
449-50 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN
AFF., 183, 183-85 (1997); James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State:
Towards a New Theory of the State under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 193, 193-94 (1999).
21. Remi Bachand, Non-State Actors in North American Legal Scholarship, in
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 97, 98; A. Claire Cutler, Critical
Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 19, 19-20 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009); see also Clapham, supra note 11, at
523. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11.
22. Yuval Shany & Rotem Giladi, The International Court of Justice, in
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 161, 161-62 (Ruth
Mackenzie et al. eds., 2012).
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the ICJ was intentionally designed to model the PCIJ both in
structure and functionality.23
At the Court, two primary types of disputes may be
heard. Most common are contentious cases, in which states
may bring a case before the ICJ against another state with a
claim that international law has been violated.24 The Court
may also hear advisory opinions.25 In those instances, the
General Assembly or certain international organizations of
the United Nations may refer a question of international law
to the Court for its opinion. Although advisory opinions are
non-binding and in principal, only consultative, they can
have a wide-ranging impact from a political perspective.
They have frequently addressed controversial international
law questions.
The ICJ, unlike subsequently-developed regional and
subject-specific judicial bodies, has universal subject matter
jurisdiction for questions brought before it. The Court’s
jurisprudence therefore covers matters of international law
as described in its statute, allowing it to interpret
international law broadly, including matters of jus cogens,
international treaties, and other traditional sources of
international law.26
A. Non-state Actors at the ICJ
In contrast to the breadth of matters that the Court may
consider under its subject matter jurisdiction, the statute of
the Court delineates narrow and specific limitations on
personal jurisdiction, both for contentious cases and for
advisory opinions of the Court. Indeed, the right of access to
a court or a tribunal colors the entirety of its activities, and
the subjects which have the right to bring and defend cases
before it may be largely determinative of the type of
23. U.N. Charter art. 92
24. Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 36, 38.
25. Id. art. 65.
26. Id. arts. 36 (governing subject matter jurisdiction generally), 38 (governing
subject matter jurisdiction for contentious proceedings), 65 (governing subject
matter jurisdiction for advisory proceedings).
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substantive law that it decides.27 Article 34, paragraph 1 and
Article 35 of the Statute limit the participation of parties in
contentious proceedings to state parties.28 Thus, the ICJ’s
foundational documents did not contemplate the
participation of NSAs in contentious cases, which is
unsurprising considering the era in which the international
community drafted the statute. The Court is designed to
function as a state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism
only, and this limitation is explicitly clear in the articles of
the statute outlining the rules for contentious cases, which
are binding on parties to the dispute.29
Advisory opinions at the ICJ, however, offer an entirely
different approach to law-making and participation. The
advisory role of the Court is not limited to inter-state
disputes, and instead, allows the Court to offer legal counsel
to UN organs and other international organizations on a
variety of legal matters. Although they have no binding force
as such, advisory opinions can have far-reaching legal
consequences.30 For example, after the Palestine and the
Kosovo advisory opinions, international organizations took
specific actions adopting resolutions and facilitating
processes that were in accordance with these decisions.31
Furthermore, advisory opinions may become binding through
specific conventions or acts of international organizations. In
the Namibia advisory opinion, the Court held that South
27. See ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 258 (2013).
28. Article 34, paragraph 1 reads that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases
before the Court,” while Article 35 offers more clarification around those states
which are not parties to the Statute, but who may still participate in contentious
cases at the Court. Notably, paragraph 3 of Article 34 recognizes that contentious
cases may affect the constituent instrument of a public international
organization, and indicates that in such situations, the “Registrar shall so notify
the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to it
copies of all the written proceedings.”
29. Contentious cases of the Court are binding upon state parties to a dispute.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59.
30. Jochen Abr. Frowein & Karin Oellers Frahm, Advisory Opinions: Article
65, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY
1605, 1621, 1623 (Andreas Zimmermann et. al. eds., 2d ed., 2012) [hereinafter
STATUTE OF THE ICJ: A COMMENTARY].
31. Id. at 1621-22.
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Africa was not legally entitled to administer the territory of
Namibia, and indicated that the UN member states were
obligated to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South
Africa’s continued presence there.32 This decision, despite its
lack of authority, had a significant impact on states’
responses toward the South African occupation of Namibia.
The Rules of the Court offer procedures for advisory
opinions distinct from those governing contentious cases.
Because the Court lacks the benefit of the parties’ pleadings
in advisory opinions, on which it relies in contentious cases,
Article 66 allows the Court a means by which to collect
information regarding the legal issue at hand.33 The statute
permits the Court to solicit the input of states or of
“international organizations,” though in these instances
these opinions are not technically binding upon the parties.34
The Court has consistently taken a strict approach to
interpreting
the
Article
66
term
“international
organizations” as only applying to state-based, principally
UN, international organizations. The ICJ affirmed a narrow
reading of the term in 1945 when the Court revised its Rules
and bypassed the opportunity to re-evaluate the role of nonstate actors within its adjudication.35 During these debates,
the judges at the PCIJ struggled with the proper
interpretation of “international organizations,” concerned
that the term was overly inclusive or exclusive, depending on
how it was to be interpreted.36 At this time, the President of
the Court indicated that he had hoped to propose the deletion
or alteration of the term “international” when referencing
“international organizations,” thereby potentially opening

32. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 133 (June 21).
33. See Andreas Paulus, Advisory Opinions: Article 66, in STATUTE OF THE ICJ:
A COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 1638, 1638-40.
34. Id. at 1638.
35. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34.
36. Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D)
No. 2, at 701-02.
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the door to non-state participation under Article 66.37 This
ultimately proved impossible, though, because Rule 73 of the
rules of the court (in which the word “international” qualified
the word “organization”) was anchored in Article 66 of the
statute and thus could not be altered.38 Thus, “international
organizations” as referenced by the statute are limited to
state-based international organizations, such as the
International Labor Organizations (“ILO”) or the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), each of which has
participated in and requested advisory opinions before the
court.39
The 1949 Reparation advisory opinion marked the first
occasion on which the Court concluded that the UN possessed
international legal personality, thus dramatically shifting
the previous understanding that only states could claim
international legal personality.40 This advisory opinion
contemplated the participation of NSAs despite the lack of
explicit inclusion in the Court’s foundational instruments.41
Although the UN is an NSA, it is comprised of states and thus
cannot be said to entirely shift away from state-centric
international law. Gleider Hernandez stresses the
importance of tempering this holding with the clarification
that any perceived expansion upon the relevance of NSAs
must hinge upon “the interests and needs of states to interact
with such non-state actors.”42 Thus, Reparation was a
shifting point in the jurisprudence of international law in
that it contributed to articulating the functional role of NSAs,
but this role did not significantly shift the focal point of
37. Id. at 702.
38. Statute and Rules of Court and Other Constitutional Documents, Rules
and Regulations, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 48.
39. See, e.g., Maureen Bezuhly, International Health Law, 31 INT’L LAW. 645,
645-46 (1997); Jacob Katz Cogan, The 2012 Judicial Activity of the International
Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 587, 587 (2013).
40. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).
41. Id. (“Throughout its history, the development of international law has been
influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase
in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action
upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States.”).
42. Hernandez, supra note 6, at 142.

2016]

ASPIRING STATES

517

international law. The Reparation decision, though it
granted the UN international legal personality, retained the
Court’s vision of the international law universe: the sun of
the international legal system is the state (or state-created
international organizations, such as the United Nations).
Any other actors, such as international organizations or
NSAs, must rotate around that sun and serve its needs.
Judges’ opinions on the Court’s exclusion of NSAs have
ranged from confirming the status quo to explicitly
challenging it. The silent majority of the Court accepts the
dominant approach of officially disallowing their
participation, and has not attempted to pry open the door to
allow NSAs to engage in the Court’s process, which has
remained closed to NSAs for decades. Yet some have
expressed concern that the exclusion of NSAs from the
Court’s process is unduly restrictive. Judge Cancado
Trindade has indicated that in certain circumstances,
individuals have a role to play at the ICJ.43 Judge Peter
Kooijmans bemoaned the absence of NSAs in the Court’s
jurisprudence,44 stating that a better relationship with civil
society is essential to bolster the Court’s capacity to discharge
its function as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations in a “shrinking and increasingly interdependent
world society.”45 Judge Rosalyn Higgins’ scholarship
indicates that the question requires further attention,
recognizing that the lack of involvement of NSAs will
continue to present challenges to the Court.46 Due to the
inherent shifts in the nature of international law, including
43. ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 16 (2011).

OF

INDIVIDUALS

TO

44. Peter H. Kooijmans, The Role of Non-State Actorss and International
Dispute Settlement, in FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE: THE GROWING IMPACT
OF NON-STATE ACTORS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE HELD IN THE HAGUE,
NETHERLANDS, 3-5 JULY 2003, 21, 23-24, 26-27 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 2004).
45. Id. at 26.
46. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW
WE USE IT 200 (1994). But see Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 287-88, ¶ 2 (July 8) (separate opinion by
Guillaume, J.) (expressing reservations over the possible influence of individuals
on the judgement of the court).
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the rise of human rights, and movements promoting selfdetermination and anti-colonialism, it is unlikely that the
concerns raised by these three prominent judges will silently
disappear from the Court’s jurisprudence.
Despite never finding a home within the statute, NSAs
have played a role within the matters adjudicated by the
Court since it came into existence. While NSAs technically
have no statutory ius standi, their rights and obligations
have been at the heart of the Court’s handling of certain
disputes.47 Although NSAs are technically excluded from the
juridical processes at the Court, in multiple instances the
Court has allowed them to participate, in various shapes and
forms, with implications for the substance of these cases.
Most significantly, NSAs have furnished the Court with
information in several advisory opinions, as discussed in Part
IV of this Article.
B. Human Rights at the ICJ
The rise of the global human rights movement has
undoubtedly affected the ICJ’s relationship to NSAs. Its
impact has had such far-reaching effects that some scholars
have described it as the human rights “revolution.”48 Human
rights have historically been enforced against governments,
granting rights to individuals and groups that may not be
protected by the state itself. As human rights gained
prominence on the world stage, the novel concept emerged in
that states acknowledged that a supra-national schema of
protection for individual, minority and peoples’ rights was
necessary. This development led to today’s complicated
system of international and regional human rights treaties
and conventions. States, in creating these international
agreements, it has been argued, ceded some of their own
sovereignty in the interest of international norms and the
greater international good. Jinks and Goodman explain that
states obey these laws despite their inherent need to cede
47. Paulus, supra note 33, at 1646.
48. THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (Akira Iriye
et al. eds., 2012); Amy Gutman, Introduction to MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY, at vii, vii-viii (Amy Gutman ed., 2001).
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some sovereignty because of the need to seek legitimacy in
the international community.49 The state has always been the
means by which individuals engage with other groups on a
global scale—the state was expected, through international
law, to protect the rights of its citizens.
Due to the dominant role of states at the ICJ, the
appropriate role for the Court to play with regard to
adjudication of human rights claims has been complex. This
is largely because human rights treaties have been primarily
designed as a means for individuals and groups to protect
their rights vis-à-vis states, if and when states violate them.
Therefore, it is not entirely obvious how a human rights case
might arrive at the ICJ, since individuals and groups do not
have standing to bring cases to the Court. Yet in a number of
cases, the Court has examined issues with significant human
rights externalities, or has interpreted states’ obligations as
per human rights norms.
There are two principal means by which human rights
matters come to be adjudicated by the ICJ, since individuals
and groups are barred from bringing these issues to the
Court’s attention. One common method is that a state raises
the issue of human rights within a contentious case against
another state. ICJ and PCIJ jurisprudence exhibits a long
history of cases in which states sought diplomatic protection
for citizens who were abroad; indeed, the need for state
diplomatic protection of its nationals underlies a central
concept of international law.50 In 2001, the ICJ emitted its
ruling in the LaGrand judgment, a watershed case for
vindication of the rights of individuals at the Court, in which
the Court determined that individuals are indeed holders of
rights under international law, even if only conferred
through multilateral treaties.51
49. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 641 (2004).
50. Enrique Milano, Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights Before the
International Court of Justice: Re-Fashioning Tradition?, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L.
85, 86, 109, 119-22 (2004).
51. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 77 (June 27)
(evaluating whether a German citizen on death row in the United States had the
right to consular access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; the
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In a number of other recent cases, however, states have
explicitly sought to vindicate the individual human rights of
citizens. In one case, Georgia lodged a complaint against
Russia, alleging that Russian treatment of Georgians had
violated its obligations under the Convention to End Racial
Discrimination
(“CERD”).52 Certainly, the indirect
beneficiaries of the case were the individuals themselves who
had been discriminated against, but the claimant, or the
actor within the Court’s proceedings, was the state of
Georgia. A similar example arises in the case of Ecuador v.
Colombia, in which Ecuador brought suit against Colombia,
alleging a violation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as a result of the aerial
spraying of coca plants in furtherance of the battle against
illegal narcotics.53 Colombian spraying, Ecuador alleged, had
severe human rights and environmental consequences for the
indigenous populations living in Ecuador along the border.54
These are only two examples of numerous cases in which
states, in these instances, Georgia and Ecuador, utilized the
ICJ as a forum in which to vindicate its citizens’ human
rights when states alleged that they had been violated by
other states. To be sure, those states may have been partially
motivated by an interest in human rights, but these cases
also furthered important political and policy goals.
Advisory opinions offer another forum for the
consideration of human rights concerns by the Court. The
General Assembly has sought the opinion of the Court
regarding human rights concerns. One of the most important
cases to do this was the Legality or Threat of Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion, in which the General Assembly
asked the Court to determine whether the use of nuclear

Court determined that the Convention “creates individual rights, which . . . may
be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person.”).
52. Application of International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 642 (Dec. 2).
53. Memorial of Ecuador, Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.),
2009 I.C.J. Pleadings 330 (Apr. 28, 2009).
54. Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 174
(May 30).
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weapons was permissible under international law,
implicating, for example, the right to life under the ICCPR.55
As scholars and jurists have observed, with the
proliferation of human rights treaties, the ICJ has emerged
as a primary locus of their adjudication, in addition to the
regional and topic-specific human rights tribunals whose
incidence has similarly increased over recent years.56 Rosalyn
Higgins has similarly predicted that human rights will
continue to occupy the concerns of the judges at the Court as
an inescapable component of its docket.57 Yet despite the
numerous cases implicating human rights concerns
adjudicated at the ICJ, on very limited occasions has the
Court explored questions regarding the human right of
peoples to self-determination.
C. The ICJ’s Treatment of the Right to Self-Determination
In light of the limited options for NSAs to engage with
process at the Court, the paucity of cases grappling with the
right to self-determination is perhaps unsurprising.
Requirements enshrined in the ICJ statute allow only states
to bring contentious cases and allow only states or
international organizations to participate in advisory
opinions. As a result, consideration of any legal issue at the
Court must be initiated by states or through the UN General
Assembly.
The right to self-determination of peoples is a relatively
new concept of international law when contrasted with the
long-standing principle of sovereignty of states. The concept
first gained prominence as a political concept through
55. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 232, 238-39 (July 8). For a comprehensive canvassing of ICJ cases relating
to human rights, see Gentian Zyberi, Human Rights in the International Court of
Justice, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR
AND BEYOND 289, 303 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010).
56. Thomas Buergenthal, Remarks at the 103rd Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, Plenary Session (Mar. 27, 2009)
(remarking on the increase of cases at the Court and linking this increase to the
rise of human rights treaties enforced there).
57. Rosalyn Higgins, Human Rights in the International Court of Justice,
20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 745, 746-48 (2007).
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President Wilson’s inclusion of the right in his post-World
War I Fourteen Points, which intended to provide relevant
guidance in an era characterized by emerging nations
advocating decolonization.58 Though subject to multiple
definitions and debates, one definition agreed upon by the
UN General Assembly indicates that the right to selfdetermination entitles all self-defined groups or peoples with
a coherent identity and a connection to a defined territory to
collectively determine their political future in a democratic
fashion, and to be free from persecution and discrimination.59
This human right is reified as one of the highest collective
rights protected by the UN Charter.60 It is listed as the first
of many rights in the human rights treaties, including the
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESC”), as well as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).61
Despite its near-universal codification, the right to selfdetermination has been characterized as one of the most
controversial norms of international law.62 The controversy is
rooted in the notion that enforcing the right is oppositional to
the right of states to territorial sovereignty. This right can be
58. Jan Klabbers, The Right to Be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in
International Law, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 186, 186-87 (2006).
59. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970).
60. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55, 73. Article 73 states that:
[m]embers of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained
a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and
accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within
the system of international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.
61. Article 1, common to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR reads: “All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
62. Klabbers, supra note 58, at 186-87 (recounting that, despite President
Wilson’s enthusiasm for the concept, his Secretary of State Robert Lansing
cautioned against promotion of the right to self-determination because it was
“simply loaded with dynamite” (citation omitted)).
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formulated within a spectrum: either as a right to internal
self-determination, in which a people may be granted selfrule within the boundaries of a sovereign state, or as the right
to external self-determination, in which a people actually
seek full legal independence or secedes from its “parent
state.”63 Any context in which a state might seek enforcement
of the right to self-determination of a people may also result
in an inherent challenge to that state’s sovereignty.64 Thus,
this right has been considered to have potentially
destabilizing effects on the position of states within
international law, and as such, states have resisted seeking
its enforcement or defining its scope.
Ultimately, self-determination is a much more complex
concept than one that simply opposes the order and stability
that states provide. Indeed, self-determination “both
supports and challenges statehood.”65 Jan Klabbers
highlights the concept’s democratic appeal: it promotes selfrule, government by and for the people, and thus is viewed as
a beacon of hope for oppressed peoples.66 But from the
perspective of a state, the concept may be considered
subversive: it may foment revolution, and undermine
stability.
Yet the balance between sovereignty and selfdetermination can be interpreted so that they need not be
viewed as oppositional to one another, as discussed by Gerry
Simpson.67 Klabbers also posits that self-determination can
no longer be viewed simply within the context of
decolonization, and that judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
have had to reconceptualize the principle which has
essentially evolved into a right of peoples to take part in
decisions affecting their future. Thus, he positions the right
63. Id. at 188-89.
64. It should be noted that a state could raise a self-determination claim for a
people not on its territory, so in theory these territorial implications of a selfdetermination claim could be avoided in some limited situations.
65. Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of
Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 249 (1994).
66. Klabbers, supra note 58, at 187.
67. Gerry Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the
Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 passim (1996).
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as a procedural right: “entities have a right to see their
position taken into account whenever their futures are being
decided.”68
It is commonly understood that state hesitation to
enforce the right to self-determination is rooted in the
concern that it may directly challenge and potentially
undermine a state’s right to territorial sovereignty. For
example, if an aspiring state, existing within the national
boundaries of a parent state, seeks to realize the right to selfdetermination, then the secession of the aspiring state might
significantly reduce the territory, resources, or population of
the parent state. The ICJ, as the UN’s principal judicial
organ and thus, essentially, the principal judicial organ of the
community of states, has hesitated to take a stance on this
right which can be viewed as jeopardizing the right of states
to territorial sovereignty. Scholars have interpreted the
Court’s hesitation to create positive law in this area as
reflecting a concern about applying the right in a way that
would further destabilize or challenge the legal order.
Of the human rights adjudicated at the ICJ, selfdetermination has a special resonance for a court designated
to adjudicate matters between states. Despite this, scholars
dispute the importance of this right. It has been suggested
that state parties included the right to self-determination
within various treaties not as a genuine right intended to be
valued and enforced by states, but instead, as a concession to
the anti-colonial movement by colonial powers who were not
yet ready to grant full independence. 69 However the right
found its place within these treaties, the right to selfdetermination is one of the most commonly listed and leastenforced rights of the human rights cannon.
This Article does not aim to provide comprehensive
treatment of the right to self-determination under
international law, a task that has been well undertaken by
68. Klabbers, supra note 58, at 189.
69. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 95-98
(2010). But see Antony Anghie, Whose Utopia? Human Rights, Development, and
the Third World, 22 QUI PARLE 63, 66-69 (2013) (acknowledging the appeal of
Moyn’s analysis but questioning his conclusions regarding human rights).
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others.70 Yet relevant background demonstrates the effects of
recent procedural allowances at the ICJ on the evolution of
the substantive right. Under international law, there exists
general agreement that the right of peoples to selfdetermination is a norm of jus cogens standing,71 codified in
numerous human rights treaties. Yet despite the nearly
universal reification of the right to self-determination, the
right is an extremely controversial when seeking
enforcement in an international court.
Very few courts have created positive law outlining the
scope and content of the right to self-determination.72 When
confronted with this issue, judicial bodies have either sought
to disassociate the right of self-determination from actual
secession, or they have declined to define any enforceable
scope or implications of the right.
In multiple cases the Court has addressed the right to
self-determination, reiterating that it is a right erga omnes,
which all nations have an obligation to enforce.73 Despite this,
70. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 67; see also Klabbers, supra note 58. See
generally THE NEW WORLD ORDER: SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (Mortimer Sellers ed., 2006).
71. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 284 (2001); see also Activities on Territory of The Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 24 (Dec. 19); East Timor (Port. v.
Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶¶ 10, 15 (June 30); STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (2010).
72. Jens Ohlin, Address at ASIL International Legal Theory Workshop: The
Elusive Concept of Peoples, (Nov. 2012) (on file with author) (discussing the
Quebec decision extensively).
73. Erga omnes obligations within international law refer to obligations owed
by states toward the community of nations, and thus which any nation may
complain of if breached. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg.
v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5); see also Accordance with
International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 79, 82-83 (July 22); Legal
Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 155 (July 9); Legal Consequences for States of
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J.
16, ¶ 126 (June 21); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16);
Rosalyn Higgins, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 691, 694 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998).

526

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

the ICJ has taken pains to avoid clarifying the scope of this
law in any practical sense. It has feverishly resisted opining
on the right to self-determination in a manner that might
lead parties to believe that they have a cognizable right to
secede from a state. The Court was grappling with this right
as early as 1949 in reference to the question of South African
control of Namibia. It was during this era when nations were
beginning to acclimate (some less so than others) to the
notion of decolonization.74 The Court first recognized the
right to self-determination in Namibia, reaffirmed it in
Western Sahara, and discussed it further in the East Timor
contentious case, where it was found by the Court that the
right to self-determination was an erga omnes right. The
Wall advisory opinion is emblematic of the Court’s hesitation
on this point. This case demonstrates clearly why the right to
self-determination and the right to territorial sovereignty
have historically been described as oppositional to one
another. In the course of its decision, the Court was required
to balance the interests of the Palestinian right to selfdetermination on the one hand, which it recognized as
legitimate.75 On the other hand, at the time of the Wall
opinion, the Israeli sovereign state governed the territory
claimed by the Palestinian right to self-determination. As a
sovereign state, it retains the right to self-defense and the
right to territorial sovereignty, sacrosanct under the UN
Charter Article 51.76 In this case, although the Court
acknowledged the existence of the right to selfdetermination, it refused to discuss the practical
consequences of the existence of that erga omnes right, or how
it might be enforced on behalf of the Palestinian people.77
74. Higgins, supra note 73, at 694.
75. Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 184, ¶ 22. The other court to pass a significant
judgment on the right to self-determination was the Canadian Supreme Court’s
decision on the question of whether Quebec had a legal right to secede. In re
Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C. 1998).
76. Article 51 provides in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter
art. 51.
77. Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 199, ¶¶ 155-57.
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Similarly in the Kosovo advisory opinion, the Court
remained largely silent on matters regarding selfdetermination. In that opinion, the Court was asked to
determine whether the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo was in accordance with international
law. Relying upon a narrow reading of the question posed,
the Court determined that it was not necessary for it to
resolve any legal question regarding self-determination,
leaving it open to the critique—levied by external as well as
internal voices—that it had missed a historic opportunity to
clarify the scope of this right.78 In the Kosovo decision, the
Court reiterated that during the second half of the twentieth
century, the “international law of self-determination
developed in such a way as to create a right to independence
for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples
subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.”79
In this case, the Court had an opportunity to clearly address
the balance between the right to self-determination and the
right to territorial sovereignty. It is clear that the Court was
attempting not to stumble into complex and difficult legal
issues, avoiding non liquet.80 The Court instead read the
question posed to it literally and did not consider a purposedriven or contextual reply to the question. Instead, it
answered only whether the declaration itself was legal. This
78. Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. at 478 ¶ 7 (separate opinion by Simma, J.). Judge
Simma calls for a more comprehensive answer to whether the Declaration of
Independence violated international law and one that would include both a
prohibitive and a permissive analysis. As Judge Simma states, “This would have
included a deeper analysis of whether the principle of self-determination or any
other rule (perhaps expressly mentioning remedial secession) permit or even
warrant independence (via secession) of certain peoples/territories.” Id.; see also
Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Delphic Dictum, How has the ICJ Contributed to the
International Rule of Law with its decision on Kosovo?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 841, 84142 (2010). See generally THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION
(Marko Milanovic & Michael Wood eds., 2015).
79. Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. at 436, ¶ 79; cf. Legal Consequences for States of
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J
16, 31-32, ¶¶ 52-53 (June 21); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J.
90, ¶ 29 (June 30); Wall, 2004 I.C.J. at 171-72, ¶ 88.
80. Bjorn Arp, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo and the
International Protection of Minorities, 11 GERMAN L.J. 847, 847 (2010).
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narrow (and some say pedantic) reading of the question
allowed the Court to avoid opining on the particular legal and
policy questions raised by an act of secession, including
questions regarding the right to self-determination of
peoples.81
As such, the Court’s approach has contributed little that
is concrete to the development of international law on the
right to self-determination. Although the approach may
appear to be haphazard, it appears upon closer examination
that it is carefully calibrated to avoid saying anything of
substance on the right to self-determination; a deliberate
indeterminacy, perhaps. If the Court seeks to resist taking a
position on this question, then any willingness on the part of
the Court to engage with aspiring states seeking to exercise
their right to self-determination must be examined carefully.
As this Article demonstrates, the Court’s procedural
treatment of those entities seeking the right to selfdetermination demands that scholars take a second look at
the Court’s contribution to this law.
III. THE OBSERVATION: AN ACCOUNT OF ASPIRING STATE
PARTICIPATION AT THE COURT
The Court’s reticence to develop positive law on the right
to self-determination notwithstanding, in several cases the
Court has confronted the right to self-determination of
aspiring states. It is in these instances that the Court has
elected to allow participation of aspiring states at the Court.
I begin by explaining what typically happens procedurally at
the ICJ when a non-state actor attempts to engage in
advisory opinions at the Court. Second, I describe the
atypical: three instances in which aspiring states have been
invited by the Court to participate in advisory opinion
proceedings. I draw some basic observations about these
situations, distinguishing the first, which occurred in 1930s,
from the second and third occasions that occurred during the
2000s. Third, I examine the tentative explanations offered by
the Court in these situations in attempts to explain why
NSAs were allowed to participate when the rules of the Court
do not allow such participation.
81. Howse & Teitel, supra note 78, at 841, 845 (2010).
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A. The Typical: Limited Participation of NSAs in Advisory
Opinions
As discussed above, the jurisdiction rationae personae of
the Court is clearly proscribed: only states may participate in
contentious cases under Article 34 of the Court’s statute. By
design, the League of Nations excluded NSAs from
participating in contentious cases from the birth of the
international juridical project of the Permanent Court of
International
Justice.82
International
organizations,
including the UN, have limited rights of participation in
contentious cases, governed by Article 34(2) and (3) of the
Statute. In contentious cases, the Court, “subject to and in
conformity with its [r]ules, may request of public
international organizations information relevant to cases
before it, and shall receive such information presented by
organizations on their own initiative.”83 Importantly, the
rules of the Court define public international organizations
as international organizations of states.84 Scholars such as
Dinah Shelton have proposed modification of this provision
to broaden the participation of international organizations
and allow non-government organization (“NGO”) access to
the Court.85
Advisory opinions offer a bit more flexibility with regard
to the participation of NSAs, but only marginally so. Article
66(2) of the Statute, governing requirements for advisory
opinions, allows for the participation of states or
international organizations who may contribute to
82. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS
92 (1920).
83. U.N. Charter art. 34, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 83 (5th ed. rev. 1995).
84. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 69, ¶ 4.
85. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611, 625-27 (1994)
(proposing that Article 34 be modified to define international organizations so as
to include not only organizations comprised of states, but also to add to it
nongovernmental organizations with consultative status with the United
Nations.).

530

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

proceedings through submitting amici to the Court.86Amici
are supposedly neutral bystanders with no direct interest in
the matter being adjudicated. Their function is first, to bring
to the attention of the Court matters of fact or law within
their knowledge, and second, as requested by the Court, to
present legal arguments which are otherwise unrepresented
by other parties. The party assists the Court with ideas of
“broad public interest which transcend the narrow issues or
concerns as delimited by parties.”87
The Article 66(2) restriction to states and “international
organizations” does not further define the latter term. Thus
the Court is left with considerable interpretive flexibility.88
Yet as discussed in Part II, its interpretation of the term
“international organization” has consistently been narrow,
most often construing it to refer to state-based international
organizations rather than considering the term to include
international non-governmental organizations, for example.
Thus, the meaning of “international organizations” within
advisory opinions closely tracks the meaning of the rules
governing contentious cases, limiting IOs to organizations
that are part of the United Nations. Only once in the Court’s
history has it allowed the participation of an international
NGO under Article 66—in the 1950 advisory opinion
International Status of South West Africa, when the Court
allowed the International League of the Rights of Man to
submit information.89 Yet in subsequent situations, the Court
86. Article 66(2) states:
The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication,
notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international
organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the
President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that
the Court will be prepared to receive, within a time-limit to be fixed by
the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be
held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.
U.N. Charter art. 66, ¶ 2.
87. Hernandez, supra note 6, at 140, 146.
88. Id. at 150 (discussing Practice Directions at the Peace Palace).
89. The League had ECOSOC consultative status. See International Status of
South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 130 (July 11) (“On March
7th, 1950, the Board of Directors of the International League of the Rights of Man
sent a communication to the Court asking permission to submit written and oral
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has utilized its discretion to prevent NGO participation in
other advisory opinions, including that of the very same
League that it had previously granted participation.90
Although the Court technically has the power to broaden the
interpretation of “international organization” under advisory
opinions to include non-state actors such as aspiring states,
it has not done so. The Court has resisted expanding the
category even to international NGOs.
Professor Dinah Shelton indicates that many national
groups and individuals have expressed interest in
participating in the proceedings at the Court, yet at the time
her seminal article on the topic was published in 1994, none
other than the League had been invited to do so.91 In the 1970
Namibia advisory proceedings, Professor Michael Reisman
inquired whether an amicus brief might be submitted before
the Court.92 In doing so, he invoked the previous permission
granted in the 1950 South-West Africa case, and also
referenced the fact that neither the Statute nor the rules of
the Court bar the registrar from accepting a document from
an interested group or individual, “despite the fact that such
group or individual could neither initiate a case nor plead
statements on the question. On March 16th, the Court decided that it would
receive from this organization a written statement to be filed before April 10th
and confined to the legal questions which had been submitted to the Court. On
the same day, the League was notified accordingly, but it did not send any
communication within the time-limit prescribed.”). Later, the Court refused to
allow the League to submit in the Asylum or Namibia cases. See Hernandez,
supra note 6, at 149-50. For further discussion of other NGOs who were refused
the right to provide information in a variety of advisory opinions as a result of the
Court’s exercise of discretion, see generally id.
90. Shelton, supra note 85, at 623 (describing the subsequent attempts of the
League to intervene in the Asylum contentious cases between Peru and Colombia,
when it was prohibited from doing so by the Court based on the distinct definition
of public international organization within the Statute as defined for contentious
cases and for advisory opinions).
91. Id. at 624.
92. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
Request for Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J 16; see Roger S. Clark, The International
League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957: The Human Rights
NGO as Catalyst in the International Legal Process, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 101, 119 n.76
(1981).

532

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

orally.” The Court’s Registrar rejected this attempt to engage with
the Court: “With reference to your suggestion that there
seems to be no explicit bar in the Statute or Rules to
accepting a document from an interested group or
individual,” the Registrar wrote, “the Court’s view would
seem to have been that the expression of its powers in Article
66, paragraph 2, is limitative, and that expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.”93 Thus, despite the attempt to include nonstate voices within this advisory opinion, the Court explicitly
rejected the proposition based on the principle that if nonstate actors were not expressly mentioned, they were to be
excluded from the statute.
Reisman’s request to intervene on behalf of the people of
Namibia appears to have been approximately thirty-five
years ahead of its time, as demonstrated by the Court’s
willingness in two cases in the early 2000s that allowed the
intervention of aspiring states at the Court.
B. The Atypical: Advisory Opinions in which Aspiring
States Participated in Proceedings
In two instances the Court, and in one instance its
predecessor, the PCIJ, has allowed the direct involvement of
NSAs in advisory proceedings. In each of these matters, the
right of NSAs to self-determination was at issue in the
advisory opinion. Although the number of times in which this
occurred is limited, each of these instances reflects a juncture
at which the Court could have taken the decision as strictly
adhering to the rules of procedure and denied the NSA a role
in the proceedings, yet in each instance, the Court permitted
the participation of these aspiring states. Each of these
circumstances is distinguished by two important
commonalities. First, it was the attempt to exercise the right
to self-determination that was the underlying issue under
consideration by the Court. Second, the international
community had become involved to such a degree that these
“peoples” were no longer under the rule of a parent nation,
yet were under international UN supervision.
93. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1970 I.C.J. Pleadings 639.
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Critically, each of these three situations involves
concerns regarding minority rights of peoples living under
the control of a majority, seeking to exercise the right to selfdetermination. In each of those situations, a “people” has
determined that self-rule is a more desirable option than the
current governing framework. It is important to distinguish
the early Danzig case at the PCIJ from the latter two cases.
In Danzig, the actors do not meet the definition of aspiring
states since the goal of the NSAs in that case was not
secession from a sovereign nation. Rather, certain peoples
sought integration into other sovereign nations. Still, this
Article analyzes the Court’s choice to allow non-state
participation in the advisory opinion at the PCIJ, because the
Court’s decision in that case demonstrates the logic of why
the court allowed participation.
The first instance in which an aspiring state played a role
in the proceedings took place in an advisory opinion
regarding the Free City of Danzig. The PCIJ’s opinion
declined to specifically mention the issue of selfdetermination, yet it provides critical subtext for the dispute.
After World War I, Poland and Germany both made claim to
the seaport of Danzig.94 The Treaty of Versailles assigned
governance and protection of the city to the League of
Nations (“The League”), the predecessor to the United
Nations. Thus, the city became a semi-autonomous city-state,
technically under the rule of the League, from 1920 to 1939.
At the time, the majority of Danzig’s population was made up
of ethnic Germans who favored reincorporation into
Germany, and in 1935, elected the National Socialist or Nazi
party to govern the Free City. The National Socialist party
then implemented legislation that was perceived by the
minority parties as targeting its political opposition. The
legislation allowed prosecutors and judges to punish
individuals for crimes not expressly stipulated by law, if
punishment was merited according to “fundamental
conceptions of a penal law and sound popular feeling.”95 The
minority parties of the Free State of Danzig brought a claim
94. Danzig is currently known as Gdansk, a seaport on the Baltic coast of
Poland.
95. Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with Constitution of
Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, ¶ 12 (Dec. 4).
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to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, arguing
that the legislation was unconstitutional under the
municipal law of the Free State. The League turned to the
PCIJ for guidance seeking an opinion regarding “whether the
said decrees [amending the Danzig Penal Code and the
Danzig Code of Penal Procedure] are consistent with the
Constitution of Danzig, or, on the contrary, violate any of the
provisions or principles of that Constitution.”96
In the course of the proceedings of the advisory opinion
to evaluate whether the legislation referenced was consistent
with the constitution, the PCIJ invited the Senate of the Free
City of Danzig, represented by the National Socialist Party,
to participate by submitting a written memorial and an oral
statement at the public sitting.97 The communication by
which the Court invited the Senate referenced that the
Senate fulfilled the requirements laid out in Article 73,
paragraph 1 of the Rules of the Court. The minority parties
were not invited as they did not meet the requirements of the
Rules of the Court for such participation.98 The Court made
this determination because it indicated that the Free City
was considered, notably, “a State admitted to appear before
the Court and likely to be able to furnish information on the
question.”99 In its findings, the PCIJ determined that the
legislation was not constitutional, validating the concerns of
the minority group.100
The Danzig advisory opinion marks the first instance in
which the Court made an ad hoc procedural decision to allow
96. Id. ¶ 26.
97. Id. ¶ 7.
98. Judge Anziolotti describes with much chagrin in his individual opinion that
the President of the Court
contented himself with acquainting them that, having regard to the
shortness of the time that had elapsed between the publication of the
decrees and the despatch [sic] of the petition, and to the possibility that
information which might be of importance in regard to the issue refer to
the Court had been omitted from the petition, the Court would be willing
to receive an explanatory note from the petitioners in case they desired
to elaborate the statements they had made in the petition.
Id. ¶ 86 (separate opinion by Anzilotti, J.).
99. Danzig, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, ¶ 4.
100. Id. ¶ 54.

2016]

ASPIRING STATES

535

the participation of an NSA. In this instance, the Senate of
the Free City of Danzig, represented by the Nazi Party,
sought for Danzig to be reintegrated into Germany.
Therefore, it cannot be clearly described an as aspiring state.
Neither are the minority parties, necessarily, since
presumably their political aim was reintegration with
Poland. Yet, this advisory opinion is instructive in that it
offers an example of the PCIJ employing ad hoc procedures
to allow the procedural participation of an NSA with many of
the same characteristics as an aspiring state. Remarkably,
the President of the Court, in his determination to invite the
participation of the Free City of Danzig, refers to it as a state.
Although one non-state actor—the Free City of Danzig—
was permitted to appear before the Court, the
representatives of the minority parties were not granted the
same allowance. Judge Anziolotti’s individual decision
describes his concern that one party was allowed to
participate while the other was not, leading to the perception
of a lack of due process and the Court’s failure to provide
equal representation. He explains:
the essential point to my mind is that the Court, in order to be able
to give this Opinion, was obliged either to set aside its Rules and
create a procedure ad hoc, or to deviate from a rule so fundamental
as that of the equality of the parties; and the reason for this was
that the case concerned a question of municipal law arising in
connection with a domestic political dispute.101

The rationale reflected in Judge Anziolotti’s opinion
emphasizes his preoccupation that the Court’s decision to set
aside its rules and allow an NSA to participate deviated from
the principle of equal representation for the parties involved.
Equality and fairness are his primary concerns, rather than
the explicit deviation from the rules. In this advisory opinion,
although the minority parties were not granted a voice at the
proceedings, the issue nonetheless resolved in their favor, as
the legislation they opposed was ultimately invalidated by
the Court.
Over seventy-five years elapsed between the Danzig
decision and the next occasion during which the Court
allowed an aspiring state to participate in proceedings. In the
101. Id. ¶ 90 (separate opinion by Anzilotti, J.).
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interim, the Court had denied the participation of a number
of aspiring states in the advisory opinions that affected their
interests, as discussed supra, specifically involving Namibia
in the South West Africa advisory opinion. Yet in 2003, the
General Assembly requested that the ICJ evaluate the
legality of Israel’s construction of a security wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory.102 In a highly controversial
decision, the Court held, among other findings, that the route
of the security barrier constructed by Israel was in violation
of international law.103 In the course of its decision, the Court
referenced that Palestinians were a “people” under
international law, and as such, Israel was obligated to
respect the Palestinian right to self-determination.104 In so
doing, the Court reiterated its finding in the East Timor case—that the right to self-determination qualified as a right
erga omnes,105 citing extensively its decisions in the
Southwest Africa cases and the East Timor case.106
Despite the great deal of international attention drawn
to this case, scholars and media generally overlooked one
potentially controversial aspect of this advisory opinion. The
Court determined that Palestine was eligible to submit a
written statement regarding the advisory opinion to the
102. The text of the request for the advisory opinion read:
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the
report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?
Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Gen. Assembly to Mr. Shi Jiuyong,
President of the Int’l Court of Justice (Dec. 8, 2003).
103. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 201 (July 9).
104. The Court found that, “[t]he obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are
the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
and certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law.” Id. at 199,
¶ 155.
105. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (July 9).
106. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 52-53 (June 21).
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Court.107 Palestine’s international legal status at the time,
however, did not meet the requirements of statehood under
international law.108 In the Wall case, the Court rationalized
its flexible approach to the participation of Palestine by
indicating that:
in the light of resolution [A/RES/]ES-10/14 and the report of the
Secretary-General transmitted [to the Court] with the request, and
taking into account the fact that the General Assembly had granted
Palestine a special status of observer and that the latter was cosponsor of the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion,
Palestine might also submit [to the Court] a written statement on
the question within the above time-limit.109

In addition to offering Palestine this mode of
participation, the UN member states furnished copies of the
question to the League of Arab States, and the Organization
of the Islamic Conference. But the Court never explicitly
requested that these organizations participate in the
proceedings. Further, the Court allowed Palestine to
participate in the oral proceedings, allowing that aspiring
state three hours time to present its claims, four times longer
than other member-states who participated in the
proceedings.110 Israel chose not to participate in the
proceedings, although the Court also offered that state a time
107. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Request for Advisory Opinion, 2003 I.C.J. 428, ¶ 2 (Dec. 19) (“[T]aking
into account the fact that the General Assembly has granted Palestine a special
status of observer and that the latter is co-sponsor of the draft resolution
requesting the advisory opinion, Palestine may also submit to the Court a written
statement on the question within the above time-limit.”).
108. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention, supra note 14; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-43 (2d ed. 2006).
109. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 141 n.4 (July 9). Notably, the Court
highlights in its order that Palestine took part in the drafting of the advisory
opinion request itself, and that it held “observer” status at the UN. Id. The United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/250 of July 13, 1998, gave Palestine the
right to sponsor resolutions. G.A. Res. 52/250, Annex ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/250
(July 13, 1998).
110. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Verbatim Record, at 17 (Feb. 23, 2004, 10:00 AM),
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/94E8ED18CFA868C585256E4A0
0582D91.
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slot of three hours, parallel to that offered to the aspiring
state, Palestine.111
The most recent instance in which the Court allowed an
aspiring state to participate in the proceedings occurred
during the 2010 Kosovo advisory opinion.112 This adjudication
arose in the wake of the 2008 Declaration of Independence of
Kosovo, purporting to establish an independent republic of
Kosovo seceding from the control of the Republic of Serbia
after years of UN control. In this instance, the UN General
Assembly, prompted by Serbia, requested an opinion from
the ICJ responding to “whether the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo [was] in accordance with
international law.”113 Although the word “self-determination”
does not appear in the question put to the Court,
commentators largely agree that the Kosovar people’s right
to self-determination was at stake and ultimately was at the
heart of the issue.114 The case was viewed, as was the Wall
decision, with great interest by the international community
and news media, due to the perceived potential for the Court
to determine the proper balance under international law
between the Kosovar people’s right to self-determination and
the Serbian Republic’s right to territorial integrity and
sovereignty.115 Disappointing some, however, the Court
determined that it was only required to answer the question
posed in a narrow fashion, thus finding that any assessment
of the right to self-determination or remedial secession was
outside the scope of the question.116
111. Id.
112. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 79, 82
(July 22).
113. G.A. Res. 64/298, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/298 (Sept. 9, 2010).
114. Alain Pellet, Kosovo—The Questions Not Asked: Self-Determination,
Secession, and Recognition, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY
OPINION 268, 269-71 (Marko Milanovic & Michael Wood eds., 2013).
115. See, e.g., Melissa Gray, Kosovo’s Independence is Legal, Court Finds, CNN
(July
23,
2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/22/kosovo.
independence.court.
116. Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 83 (“The General Assembly has requested the
Court’s opinion only on whether or not the declaration of independence is in
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Although its decision did not offer a finding regarding the
right to self-determination, the Court’s treatment of Kosovo
during the proceedings prompts a more careful reading of the
decision. Upon accepting the case, the Court invited the
Authors of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo to
submit a written observation to the Court within the same
time limits imposed on the states of the UN.117 By order of
October 17, 2008, the Court indicated that “taking account of
the fact that the unilateral declaration of independence . . . is
the subject of the question submitted to the Court for an
advisory opinion, the authors of above declaration are
considered likely to be able to furnish information on the
question.”118
Numerous states argued for an explicit stipulation by the
General Assembly that the authors of the declaration should
be permitted to participate in their own name, so as to ensure
fairness in the proceedings.119 As in the Wall case, the authors
of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo were invited to
participate in the oral proceedings. Similar to the
representatives from Palestine, the representatives from
Kosovo were also invited by the Court to present for a longer
period of time in comparison with the other parties: all

accordance with international law. Debates regarding the extent of the right of
self-determination and the existence of any right of ‘remedial secession’, however,
concern the right to separate from a State. As the Court has already
noted . . . , and as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the scope of
the question posed by the General Assembly.”).
117. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Request for Advisory Opinion, 2008 I.C.J.
407, 410 (Oct. 17).
118. Id. For an archive of all case materials, see INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=
3&p2=4&case=141&p3=0cij.org (last visited May 23,2016).
119. United Kingdom: “[W]e would expect that, as a matter of basic fairness,
Kosovo will be permitted to participate in the proceedings and present arguments
to the Court.” Letter from John Sawers, Permanent Representative of U.K. of Gr.
Brit. and N. Ir. to United Nations, to President of the Gen. Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/63/461 (Oct. 2, 2008); see also U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 22d plen. mtg. at 13-14,
U.N. Doc. A/631/PV.22 (Oct. 22, 2008).
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member states were given forty-five minutes, while Kosovo
and Serbia were each granted three hours.120
C. Explaining the Court’s Procedural Inclusion of Aspiring
States
We can draw a number of basic observations about each
of these “atypical” advisory opinions at the ICJ in which the
Court (or the PCIJ) took the unorthodox step of allowing the
participation of aspiring states to participate in the advisory
opinions. In each, the Court makes a number of procedural
allowances not explicitly contemplated by the Court’s Statute
or the Rules of the Court. First, it invites an NSA—neither a
state nor an international organization—to participate in the
proceedings through written submissions. Second, it invites
an NSA to participate in oral submissions, and grants that
entity three hours as opposed to the forty-five minutes
offered to all other member states. Third, the court chooses
to refer to the aspiring state by a name that cannot be
confused with a state: Kosovo is not “Kosovo” but the
“Authors of the Declaration of the Independent State of
Kosovo” or “The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
of Kosovo”; Palestine is not “Palestine” but the
“Representatives
of
Palestine”;
and
Danzig
is
“Representatives of the Free City.”
I propose that the Court is using the flexibility inherent
in advisory opinions to do procedurally what it is not yet
ready to do substantively: to suggest a more favorable,
legitimizing approach to self-determination for certain
aspiring states. Through these three procedural choices, the
Court has positioned aspiring states as essential adversaries
to the states from which they seek independence. In doing so,
these advisory opinions mimic contentious cases in format
including the invitation of aspiring states and the time
allocated to each. The court tempers its treatment of aspiring
states, however, by taking care to refer to the actors through
language that clarifies they are not actually states, and
through, of course, the larger framework of the advisory
120. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Verbatim Record, at 30 (Dec. 1, 2009,
10:00 AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.
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opinion. In contentious cases, each of the two state parties in
a conflict is allowed three hours to argue its own position
against its adversary. In advisory opinions, the Court
typically permits “interested states” to submit comments
regarding the legal question at hand. Once the time comes
for hearings on the matter, those same states are invited to
present their positions before the Court. A review of the
record of recent advisory opinions reveals that states are
typically granted a forty-five minute oral intervention before
the Court. Yet in the two recent advisory opinions addressing
aspiring states, time allotment has not followed this pattern.
In the Palestine advisory opinion both Palestine and Israel
were allotted three hours to present their case, while all other
state parties were granted only forty-five minutes, as is
typical.121 Similarly, in the Kosovo advisory opinion, both
Serbia and the Authors of the Provisional Declaration of
Independence in Kosovo were each granted three hours of
presentation time. The twenty-eight other member states
that presented were allowed forty-five minutes for their
interventions.122
Below, I discuss three explanations for how the Court
rationalizes participation of aspiring states. These include
first, the option that the statute does indeed allow for
inclusion of NSAs under Article 66(2); second, that the need
to gather information demands inclusion; and third, that
fairness requires inclusion. Each of these possibilities stems
from the inherent flexibility of the advisory function.
Article 66(2) of the ICJ statute offers the only potential
for a statute-based explanation for inclusion of aspiring
states.123 Indeed, one scholar, Yaël Ronen, indicates that
121. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Verbatim Record, at 17, ¶ 3 (Feb. 23, 2004, 10:00 AM), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1503.pdf. Importantly, Israel declined to participate in the
proceedings for this advisory opinion, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction
to adjudicate the case and as such it was a non-justiciable issue because of the
political nature of the question asked by the U.N. General Assembly. Id. ¶ 1.
122. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Verbatim Record, at 30, ¶ 3 (Dec. 1, 2009,
10:00 AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15710.pdf.
123. Article 66(2) reads:
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Article 66(2) offers a clear rationale for the Court’s allowance,
claiming that “there is no doubt that this provision is the
basis for the invitation.”124 Yet as I demonstrate below, this
explanation is inadequate. Article 66(2) grants authority for
the Court to invite states and international organizations to
participate in advisory opinions. None of the entities of
Danzig, Palestine, nor Kosovo meet the limited legal
standard of international organizations defined by the Court,
which requires them to be international organizations
comprised of states.125 These aspiring states are more similar
to states than to international organizations. Palestine’s
status at the time of the advisory opinion is best described as
an aspiring state or a quasi-state, meeting some of the
criteria of statehood which the Court referenced in its
decision to allow its participation. Kosovo, at the time of the
advisory opinion, had declared independence and had been
recognized by a number of nations as a state, but did not yet
have universal international recognition as required by
international law. Indeed, in the Danzig decision, the
President of the Court even referred to the Free City of
Danzig as a state—presumably mistakenly though
reiterating that these aspiring states share many more
characteristics with states than with international
organizations.
Thus, in both the Wall advisory opinion and the Kosovo
advisory opinion, the Court formally invited aspiring states
to participate in proceedings completely at the discretion of
the Court, acting outside the authority granted to it in the
statute or the rules of procedure of the Court. I propose that
The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication,
notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international
organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the
President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that
the Court will be prepared to receive, within a time-limit to be fixed by
the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be
held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.
U.N. Charter art. 66, ¶ 2.
124. Yaël Ronen, Participation of Non-State Actors in ICJ Proceedings, 11 LAW
& PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 77, 95 (2012).
125. See supra pp. 529-30 (discussing ICJ statutory criteria for allowing amici
in the course of advisory opinions); see also Shelton, supra note 85, at 620.
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these cases offer evidence of situations in which—relying on
the flexible nature of the advisory function—the Court
shepherded in the participation of NSAs without any statutebased explanation.126 Indeed, Gleider Hernandez references
the opaqueness of the Court’s decision, which offered no
explanation as to the legal basis upon which it relied.127 If
Article 66(2) were the basis, would the Court not be inclined
to simply articulate this basis? Instead, the Court explicitly
avoided inclusion under Article 66(2), since were it to have
done so, it might have been forced to overtly characterize
these bodies as either states or international organizations.
If Article 66(2) does not offer a satisfying explanation for
the inclusion of aspiring states in the Court’s process, the
Court offers two other explanations for the inclusion of NSAs.
In the Kosovo advisory opinion, the Court explained its choice
to include NSAs with a utilitarian logic stemming from
language in Article 66(2), citing its interest in including those
parties as being “likely to be able to furnish information on
the question.”128 This may be accurate, as these entities
certainly did provide information to the Court, yet the
explanation offers no legal basis for the procedural
allowance. The entire reason the dispute found itself before
the Court was the attempt by the aspiring state to become
such a state. Therefore, such an innocuous, informationgathering explanation by the Court is certainly accurate, yet
scholars should find it suspicious that a Court so rooted in
procedure and in the state-centric approach to international

126. Process verbal are the documentation of the proceedings from these
confidential meetings. Based on confidential conversations with judges and legal
staff present in these meetings, it was clear that none of the judges were of the
opinion that Article 66(2) offered an easy solution to the involvement of aspiring
states.
127. Hernandez, supra note 6, at 140, 143.
128. G.A. Res. 63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008). By order of October 17, 2008, the Court found
that, “taking account of the fact that the unilateral declaration of
independence . . . is the subject of the question submitted to the Court for an
advisory opinion, the authors of above declaration are considered likely to be able
to furnish information on the question.” Accordance with International Law of
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Order of 17 October
2008, 2008 I.C.J. 409, 410 (Oct. 17, 2009).
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law should offer such a simple explanation for contradicting
that procedure.
A somewhat more satisfying explanation for the
procedural inclusion of aspiring states is the Court’s
preoccupation with the notion of “fairness.”129 Although this
term is never specifically defined, the Court has embraced
this concept on numerous occasions in reference to the role of
aspiring states at the Court. This concept was first explicitly
discussed in ICJ jurisprudence when it emerged from Judge
Anziolotti’s individual opinion in the Danzig decision,
criticizing the majority for allowing the Free City of Danzig
to submit a written statement and to make oral statements.130
Anzilotti’s concern with the exclusion of the minority parties
reiterates the longstanding principle of audiatur et altera
pars–“a general principle of procedural law which serves in
the interpretation of the Statute’s provisions” and indicates
that no person should be judged without fair hearing in which
each party is given the right to be heard.131
Concerns about procedural fairness also arose in a
number of other ICJ cases. In the Wall advisory opinion the
Court relied on the concept in its invitation to Palestine to
participate; presumably the concern was that fairness
dictated that it would be unfair for Israel, a state, to
participate in the proceedings of an advisory opinion while
Palestine was excluded from the opportunity. The fairness
logic as rationale for Palestine’s participation is potentially
undermined by Israel’s ultimate refusal to participate in the
proceedings, though perhaps it is the opportunity to
participate, not the participation itself that is crucial to the
perceived fairness. The Court also referenced the need for
129. THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8-11
(1995). Franck’s seminal work on the appropriate role of fairness within the field
of international law addresses this question, positing that the notion of fairness
must be central to the development of international law.
130. Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with Constitution of
Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, ¶¶ 82, 84, 87 (Dec. 4)
(separate opinion by Anzilotti, J.) (arguing that the Court should have refused to
give its opinion due to—among other reasons—the manifestly unequal positions
of the parties due to the Court’s invitation to participate to the Senate (the
National Socialist Party) but not to the three minority parties).
131. Ronen, supra note 124, at 97-98.
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fairness within the Kosovo proceedings. As state members of
the General Assembly debated whether to refer the question
to the ICJ, some argued for an explicit stipulation that the
authors of the declaration should be permitted to participate
in their own name, so as to ensure fairness in the
proceedings.132
If the value of “fairness” allows participation of aspiring
states within some recent advisory opinions, then aspiring
states have clearly not fared as well in the context of
contentious cases at the ICJ. Generally, advisory opinions
offer the Court flexibility with regard to procedural
requirements that it does not enjoy in contentious cases. This
flexibility can be attributed to a number of factors, including
the non-binding nature of advisory opinions, or the
“information-gathering” allowances permitted in Article 66.
This flexibility is exemplified by comparison with the
Portugal v. Australia contentious case.133 This case, often
referred to as the “East Timor” case because of the subject
matter in dispute, offers an excellent foil to the Court’s
treatment of aspiring state actors, especially when
considering the question of fairness toward parties involved
in the proceedings.
In that case, Portugal, the initial colonizer of East Timor,
initiated a contentious case at the ICJ claiming that
Australia violated the rights of the peoples of East Timor to
self-determination when Australia and Indonesia signed an
agreement allocating East Timorese natural resources. At
the time that the Court adjudicated this case in 1994, East
Timor fit the description of an aspiring state, as it had not
yet been recognized on a widespread basis as a state. In 1975,
the nation declared independence from Portugal, but was
subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesia.134 Thus,
132. For example, the United Kingdom took the position that “[they] would
expect that, as a matter of basic fairness, Kosovo will be permitted to participate
in the proceedings and present arguments to the Court.” Letter from John
Sawers, Permanent Representative of U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to United
Nations, to President of the Gen. Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/461 (Oct. 2, 2008); see
also U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 22d plen. mtg., supra note 119, at 11-14.
133. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
134. Id. ¶ 13.

546

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

although the central question asked whether the right to selfdetermination of East Timor had been violated while the
nation was under occupation by Indonesia, the Court did not
consult with East Timor or offer that aspiring state any role
in the proceedings.
The Court’s decision on admissibility relied on a wellestablished principle of international law: that a court can
only exercise jurisdiction over a state with its consent.135 The
Court found that Australia’s behavior could not be assessed
without Indonesia being a party to the case, and thus it
declined to hear the case based on lack of jurisdiction.136 This
principle, first articulated in the Monetary Gold case,
reinforces the Court’s stated interest in the value of fairness,
in particular with regard to representation before the Court.
Monetary Gold stands for the proposition that if a party’s
legal interests form the very subject-matter of a decision,
then the Court cannot take a decision without the input of
the state. Thus, this case reinforces the important basic
principles of procedural fairness and due process at the
Court.137 There, the Court explained that the “very-subject
matter” test as articulated by the Court was the ruling
determination, and not the mere fact that a case “might affect
the legal interests” of another state.138 Despite the Court’s
reliance on this principle, however, the question of whether
East Timor should be party to the case was never addressed
in the proceedings.
135. Monetary Gold first articulated this principle, later confirmed in
subsequent court jurisprudence. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It.
v. Fr.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32 (June 15). The Court distinguished between
cases in which a non-participating country’s legal interests would be affected by
a decision, as opposed to one in which a non-participating country’s legal interests
would form the very subject matter of a decision. The Court held that in the
former instance it was acceptable to make a decision without the input of that
state, but not in the latter instance. Id.
136. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 35 (June 30).
137. Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32). In Monetary Gold, the
Court ruled that the legal interests of Albania could not be adjudicated at the
Court in the course of a contentious case to which Albania was not a party. The
Court could not take any decision on the case because “Albania’s legal interests
would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter
of the decision.” Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32.
138. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32.
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None of these explanations as to how the Court permitted
the procedural inclusion of aspiring states proves entirely
satisfactory. This Article argues that the principle of fairness
in representation, as articulated throughout the
jurisprudence of the ICJ, offers crucial insight into the
Court’s choice to include certain aspiring states in its process
in recent years. This principle is not a new one, as it can be
traced to the Danzig decision as well as to the formative
Monetary Gold case. If there is no clear statute-based
rationale for the Court’s inclusion, we must inquire why the
Court engages in judicial rulemaking to include aspiring
states in the advisory opinions. This question is tackled in
Part V.
IV. THE ICJ AS A FORUM FOR ASPIRING STATES
As discussed above, there is no statute-based explanation
as to why the Court allows aspiring states to be included in
its process. Yet an exploration of the rationale that the Court
has offered in these instances reveals two important hidden
consequences of the aspiring state advisory opinions. First,
the centrality of the right to self-determination in these
opinions indicates that the procedural inclusion of non-state
actors may have a substantive consequence. Second, these
opinions offer important insight with regard to legitimacy
within international law—both of the International Court of
Justice as an institution, and of the non-state actors who
aspire to gain legitimacy within the international
community, through recognition as states.
A. The Centrality of Self-Determination and of
International Sponsorship
Each of the aspiring state advisory opinions contains odd
features not seen in any other advisory opinion at the Court.
An aspiring state is first invited to participate. It is then
granted time to present arguments as if it were a party in a
contentious case. Finally, that aspiring state is referred to by
a name that cannot be confused with a state. These oddities
result from the choice that the Court has made to include the
aspiring state in its process. In order to understand these
choices, we must work backwards from the instance when
these aspiring states are granted status at the Court. What
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factors do they share in common that might lead to the
Court’s choice to include them?
In order for the Court to decide to include an aspiring
state in its process, three important pre-conditions must be
met. First, the right to self-determination of peoples lies at
the crux of each case. Yet, simply because an NSA or a
“people” seeks to validate its self-determination, the Court
will not necessarily approve participation. These actors, by
the time the matter at hand arrived at the ICJ, had achieved
international sponsorship from the international community
of state actors, or some segment thereof, thus validating
aspirations toward statehood of an NSA. Finally, the
questions regarding an aspiring state must arrive at the
Court through the mechanism of an advisory opinion, rather
than through a contentious case (as in the instance of the
East Timor case). When these three elements are present, the
Court has used the flexibility of the advisory opinion
mechanism to position aspiring states as if they were states
for the purpose of the proceedings, offering procedural
fairness and legitimization of its claim to self-determination,
even if the Court is reticent in substantively validating this
right through positive law.
In each of the circumstances discussed in Part III, the
entity in question—at the time it was invited to participate
in ICJ proceedings—was under the administration of the
international community or had been formally recognized by
the international community in one way or another. I refer to
this status as international “sponsorship” of one form or
another. Danzig was governed by the League of Nations, an
arrangement set up under the Treaty of Versailles. In 1974
the Palestinian Liberation Organization was granted nonstate entity observer status at the UN;139 in 1994 under the
Oslo Agreements and as a result of UNSCR 242 and 338,
Palestine was granted territorial control of parts of the West
Bank.140 In the Wall decision, the Court explicitly referenced
139. G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX) (Nov. 22, 1974) (granting observer status to the
PLO). The PLO has established a permanent observer mission since 1974 at U.N.
headquarters in New York and another one in Geneva.
140. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993); Interim Agreement on the West
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Palestine’s “special status.”141 Kosovo, since the NATO
intervention and the passage of UN SR 1142, had been
governed by the provisional government there, and owed its
existence to international legal framework.142
Thus, in instances where the sponsorship of the
international community already exists, this serves as a
signal to a court whose constituency consists of that same
international community. The Court takes its lead from the
international community, which has already made a choice
to intervene and govern the NSAs through the international
legal structures imposed in each setting. As a result, the
Court’s choice to grant standing is not actually as
controversial as it might otherwise be, since it was preceded
by international sponsorship of the aspiring state and thus
sanctioned by international community of states. This then
allays the concern that any rogue state might decide to have
its claim to self-determination put before the Court. Unless
that rogue state had the sponsorship of a significant part of
the international community, there is little danger that it
would be permitted to appear before the Court. While the
Court’s move is unorthodox, it is still sanctioned by states,
allowing the Court to continue to balance the interests of the
state itself though authorizing a procedural choice that
appears to undermine the centrality of the state.
The procedural choice to allow aspiring states to
participate allows the Court to acknowledge the special
interest that these parties have in the outcome of the
proceedings. Perhaps most importantly, in each of these
cases, the NSA’s right to self-determination plays a crucial
role within the legal questions being adjudicated at the court.
The state-centric Statute explicitly prohibits the Court from
hearing a contentious case between a state and a non-state
(Serbia v. Kosovo, or Palestine v. Israel, for example). Yet the
Court and the international community have used the
advisory opinion function to explore the legal aspects of these
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997); S.C.
Res. 242 (Nov. 22 1967); S.C. Res. 338 (Oct.22 1973).
141. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 4 (July 9) (“[T]he General
Assembly had granted Palestine a special status of observer.”).
142. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶¶ 10-11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
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disputes at the ICJ, recognizing that international law must
allow aspiring states a voice within these proceedings.
Certainly, a number of other tribunals exist (such as human
rights or investment dispute bodies) which may be better
suited to address the concerns of NSAs, obviating the need
for the ICJ to be accessible to actors other than states.
Regardless of the existence of other fora, these advisory
opinions directly affect the rights and futures of peoples
pertaining to aspiring states. Therefore, it is appropriate and
legitimacy-enhancing for the ICJ to allow these NSAs to be
heard in this context. Klabbers’ argument that the right to
self-determination is actually a procedural right, is
reinforced by the actions of the Court here; it is the “right to
see their position taken into account whenever their futures
are being decided.”143 Although in the substance of its
decisions in these cases the Court is reticent to forcefully
delineate the balance between self-determination and
territorial sovereignty, its procedural choices with regard to
allowing NSAs a voice at the table belie a more progressive
posture than the holding in the judgment itself. Allowing
aspiring states to participate also demonstrates that the
Court is acutely aware of the relevance of NSAs within
international law, the values of fairness and human rights,
and the impact these choices may have on the normative
legitimacy of the Court itself.
B. Balancing Legitimacy
The Court’s ruptures with previous statute-based
procedure in the aspiring state cases can be understood
through applying a legitimacy framework. Although
legitimacy pulls the Court in multiple directions, I propose
that a legitimacy analysis, rooted in democratic theory,
explains the Court’s treatment—both procedurally and
substantively—of aspiring states. Below, I discuss the ways
in which the aspiring state cases intersect with legitimacy
questions first with regard to the legitimacy of the Court
itself, and second, with regard to the legitimacy of the
aspiring states as they strive to become states.

143. Klabbers, supra note 58, at 189.
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Contextualizing the Court’s treatment of aspiring states
within a legitimacy framework offers insight into these
unorthodox choices for a Court that is commonly considered
the most traditional of international courts. Legitimacy is
central within international law because of the principle that
courts’ work must be rooted in justified authority, and if it is
not, their interpretation of the law is endangered and
subsequently, delegitimized. One scholar reiterates the
importance of legitimacy by cautioning that,
[t]o the extent we want international courts to continue to serve as
a forum for the resolution of disputes involving sovereigns, we must
preserve their legitimacy. Because no world legislature exists to
counterbalance the decisions of international courts, and no
worldwide police force enforces them, international courts’
legitimacy is all the more essential to their success.144

Despite its universal jurisdiction, the ICJ is not exempt from
these concerns.
Scholars typically classify legitimacy as either normative
or sociological. Legitimacy in the sociological sense indicates
that an institution is legitimate if “it is widely believed to
have the right to rule.” It “depends on [actor] perceptions and
is agent-relative.”145
Meanwhile, a court’s normative legitimacy hinges upon
whether it has the right to rule—in the case of the ICJ, a
right that is explicitly conferred upon the Court by states.
This is “the ‘right to rule[,]’ the exercise of which ‘binds’ its
subjects by imposing duties of obedience.”146 The UN Charter
indicates that the Court is the primary judicial organ of the
United Nations. Certainly, the Court continues to have a
strong connection to the United Nations and the states that
comprise it. Academics frequently critique the Court’s
144. Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts,
86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 63 (2013).
145. Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 405 (2006); see also Yuval
Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 246-47 (2012).
146. John Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY
Besson & John Tasouilas eds., 2010).
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conservative outlook and its highly formalistic procedure and
decision-making process, frequently linking these criticisms
to the Court’s excessive deference to state sovereignty.147 As
explained by Yuval Shany, the relationship between the
Court and states can be characterized by viewing states as
“mandate providers” to the Court.148 Because states provide
the Court with its mandate through the United Nations, in
order to retain its legitimacy, the Court cannot completely
disregard their perspective.
Maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the Court’s
mandate-providers has clearly played a significant role in the
Court’s jurisprudence. None of the structural attributes of
the Court necessarily suggest that states actively exert
control over the judges. Yet there does exist the perception
that states may try to control judicial perspectives through
appointment of judges, a highly political process carried out
through the UN General Assembly. Interviews with judges
indicate that the ICJ is largely composed of judges who are
by and large, respectful of (if not deferential to) states’
interests and sovereignty.149 The ICJ continues to be
perceived as legitimate while at the same time having in
place structures and processes that ensure a degree of
responsiveness to “client preferences.”150
The ICJ’s reliance on protecting the interest of states has
led to judicial avoidance of legal issues that may be
controversial from a state-based perspective, including the
right to self-determination. This right has for decades been
perceived to be in direct opposition to the right of territorial
sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter. The Court has
typically approached this right with avoidance and
hesitation, most likely due to a concern that a more definitive
stance might further destabilize or challenge the dominant
147. See, e.g., Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru Oda and the
International Court of Justice, 33 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 185, 206-07 (1995); see also
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 43-46 (1998).
148. See Shany, supra note 145, at 240.
149. Id. at 246; see also Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and
Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 127 (2001).
150. See Shany, supra note 145, at 260.
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legal order.151 Other high profile cases in various subject
areas at the ICJ illustrate “judicial avoidance techniques,”
and also reflect judges’ “apprehension of alienating
important players or major segments of the international
community.”152 Yet these judicial avoidance techniques,
though they may be genuinely responsive to concerns
regarding its mandate-providers, may simultaneously
jeopardize the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of critics
(including some of the Court’s very own judges) who express
concern that the Court is out of touch with the most pressing
legal issues of the day.153
Yet a legitimacy framework also pulls the Court in the
opposite direction, away from the interests of mandateproviders who undergird the international system of law.
Certainly, legitimacy relies on the right that an institution
has to rule—in the ICJ’s case, the legitimacy it derives from
the state-granted authority through the UN Charter. Despite
this, some non-state groups and individual citizens may
sometimes reasonably question the legitimacy of an
international institution even though their own states have
consented to its jurisdiction and its presumptive right to
rule.154 This phenomenon may be particularly acute in
instances when a state does not appear to be acting in the
best interests of individuals or groups within its boundaries.
151. Hernandez, supra note 6, at 140, 143-44.
152. Shany & Giladi, supra note 22, at 176 (referencing the Nuclear Weapons
and Oil Platforms decisions, inter alia, as examples).
153. In the wake of the Kosovo advisory opinion, harsh criticism was launched
upon the court, as it was widely perceived to have done very little when it could
have been much more relevant had it engaged more actively with the issues at
stake: “If the fate of Kosovo – and the entire Balkan region – is to be guided by
the global rule of law, these questions need to be answered, not swept under the
table. Under existing procedures, framing questions to the World Court is entirely
a prerogative of states, either as contending parties or, as with the Kosovo
opinion, operating through the UN. But the rights of persons and peoples, not just
interests of states, are at stake in controversies such as this one. To fulfill
international justice today, we need a new kind of World Court, open to other
voices.” Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Viewpoint: The World Court and
Secessionism, KOREAN JOONANG DAILY (Aug. 3, 2010), http://koreajoongangdaily.
joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2924035.
154. Allan Buchanan, Legitimacy in International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 146, at 79, 87.
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The aspiring state cases are emblematic of these situations,
in that the states from whom aspiring states seek to secede
are typically not supportive of enforcement of the right to
self-determination for those peoples who make up the
aspiring state.
Democratic models vary, yet can be characterized by and
large by emphasis on representation, participation by affected actors,
accountability, and deliberation.155 When applying democratic
theory to the question of legitimacy, a court’s legitimacy
relies on “institutions publically committed to the equal
advancement of the interests of the persons who are affected
by those institutions.”156 Beyond this, democratic
conceptualization of legitimacy would require both
procedural and substantive adequacy. A key principle
provides that those parties who are affected by institutions
should have a voice in relevant judicial proceedings.
Democratic theory implies that to maintain legitimacy, a
court must consider not only whether its role is legitimate
from the perspective of its mandate providers, but also from
that of entitlement holders—those actors which are affected
by judgments but which do not grant the institution
authority. These entitlement holders, such as non-state
actors in the case of the ICJ, are nonetheless affected by the
Court’s course of action.
The ICJ, then, is faced with a crisis of legitimacy from
the perspective of democratic theory. Aspiring states are
entitlement holders at the Court, although they are not
mandate providers. Yet they are denied procedural access to
the Court under the Statute, which has the potential to
undermine the Court’s legitimacy from a democratic theory
analysis. The state-based system relies on the notion that
states represent the interests of their citizens; however,
clearly states do not always best represent the interests of
155. See Gráinne de Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 227 (2008) (discussing participation and representation of
affected parties); J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law – Governance,
Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 547, 560 (2004) (referencing
representation, accountability, and deliberation as democratic values).
156. Thomas Christiano, Democratic Legitimacy and International Relations, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 146, at 119, 121.
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people in those states. Professor Christiano highlights three
variants of incidents in which states may fail to represent the
individuals living within their boundaries.157 The context of
non-state actors, who are peoples representing minorities
within sovereign states, can be described as the minority
variant, in that minority groups are not adequately
represented by states. Not only do states sometimes fail to
best represent their citizens, but scholars have demonstrated
convincingly that international litigation affects the rights
and interests of states beyond only those states that litigate
disputes.158 In several recent cases (both contentious and
advisory) at the ICJ, non-litigants’ rights were directly
affected by proceedings in which they had no right to
appear.159
These challenges to the legitimacy of the Court represent
a sea-change for a court traditionally wedded to a statecentric concept of international law. The recognition that
state consent is insufficient grounding for the legitimacy of
international law is becoming more and more widespread. 160
Not only are NSAs increasingly important globally, but
further, the “idea that state sovereignty itself is conditional
on the protection of human rights seems to be taking hold.”161
This indicates that that the position of states may also be in
157. Id. Christiano classifies these occasions on which states do not best
represent this interests of its people as the authoritarian variant, the minority
variant, and the secrecy variant. Id.; see also Knop, supra note 5, at 153-55
(discussing specifically the minority variant with respect to affinity groups—
including feminist or women’s groups—whose interests may not be wellrepresented by the nation-state).
158. Grossman, supra note 144, at 68 (claiming that international law affects
constituency broader than only states who are litigating, and secondly that
international law decisions are not intended to be one-time decisions, affecting
only the litigants at hand).
159. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 99, ¶¶ 18-19 (Feb. 3). Numerous other cases at the ICJ also provide evidence
of non-state actors’ interests being affected by the court’s decisions, including,
Activities on Territory of The Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 24 (Dec. 19) and Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep.
Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639 (Nov. 30).
160. Buchanan, supra note 154, at 91 (“It is something of a commonplace that
the international legal order is becoming less exclusively state-centered and more
concerned with human rights.”).
161. Id. at 95.
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jeopardy within the international legal order if they are not
compliant with human rights norms.
Although the Court offers aspiring states procedural
access to the Court in these advisory opinions, thus
potentially bolstering the legitimacy of the Court from a
democratic theory perspective, the Court nevertheless
refuses to engage substantively with those actors’ right to
self-determination. This pattern is perhaps best evidenced in
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. This omission might serve to
undermine the legitimacy of the Court. Might the lack of
syncretism between the Court’s procedural posture and its
substantive posture indicate a failing to truly provide
representation to aspiring states, and thus further jeopardize
its legitimacy? Yuval Shany explains that two types of
legitimacy must be linked to notions of fairness and justice.
First, source legitimacy relies on the concept of democratic
consent, stemming from the democratic conceptualization of
legitimacy. Consent may be rooted in a theory that justifies
government power as an expression of the will of the
people,162 or invokes another theory of justice or fairness.163
The other type of legitimacy, process legitimacy, focuses on
whether regular and proper procedures are followed
throughout the judicial decision-making process. Here, the
key standard for evaluation appears to be fairness of the
process—that is, whether the process meets our pre-existing
expectations of institutional conduct that conform to specific
standards of procedural justice.164
Shany concludes that a specific judicial decision would be
typically regarded as legitimate if it is issued by a properly
established international court, applying its legal procedures
in a regular manner.165 If regular application of legal
procedures is required for legitimacy, this might lead to the
conclusion that the aspiring state advisory opinions are
illegitimate due to the unorthodox application of procedure
162. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 23, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
163. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 11-17 (1971); see also Phillip
Pettit, Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-Republican Perspective, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 128, 139, 142-43.
164. Shany, supra note 145, at 253-54.
165. Id. at 266-69.
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and the allowance of aspiring states’ participation. Yet
legitimacy exists on a continuum, whereby decisions lacking
in process legitimacy can be compensated for in source
legitimacy, and vice versa. Thus, the court may take the
unorthodox step to compromise its process legitimacy by
allowing aspiring states to participate, in the eyes of its
primary constituency of states. Yet, there may be an uptick
in the perception of source legitimacy (rooted in democratic
theory) when aspiring states are treated with fairness, and
afforded the chance to represent themselves within the
procedures that affect their interests. Hence we see a Court
seeking to achieve a balance between these two groups:
states, its mandate-providers, and aspiring states, who hold
rights. If legitimacy is evaluated on this continuum, taking
into account both source legitimacy and process legitimacy,
the Court’s choice to include aspiring states in its process is,
on the whole, legitimacy enhancing.
My theory that the Court’s actions are rooted in
democratic legitimacy with regard to aspiring states garners
support not only from these scholarly and theoretical
accounts, but also from ICJ case law. The Court’s
jurisprudence, traced back to as far as to the PCIJ,
demonstrates that the Court views democratic legitimacy as
a crucial consideration in its deliberations, although not
explicitly referenced as such.
Yet the Court does use other language to rely on
democratic legitimacy: in Monetary Gold the Court affirms it
cannot exercise its jurisdiction without state consent, a
position that is reiterated in such cases as East Timor.
Perhaps most tellingly, the above-referenced individual
opinion voiced by Judge Anziolotti in the Danzig Advisory
Opinion emphasizes the centrality of the need for fair
representation echoing democratic principles.166 Anzilotti’s
concern with the exclusion of the minority parties in that case
speaks to the need for procedural equality within the Court
in order to emphasize the principle of audiatur et altera
pars—a general principle of procedural law which indicates
that no person should be judged without fair hearing in which
166. See Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with Constitution
of Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 27, ¶¶ 87-91 (Dec. 4)
(separate opinion by Anzilotti, J.).

558

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

each party is given the right to participate. In addition to
these ideals articulated in Monetary Gold and by Anzilotti in
Danzig, the Court’s jurisprudence has also relied on notions
of democratic representation fairness, though more
abstractly so, in the Court’s orders in the aspiring state
advisory opinions themselves. As discussed supra, the
request to Palestine to participate explicitly reference the
need for “fairness.”167 Though the Court does not further
explain this reference, democratic representation is rooted in
the same central interest of fairness. Finally, in Application
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), the ICJ stressed the importance of the
“fundamental principle of consent,”168 which also reiterates
the centrality of democratic principles of legitimacy.
Although the Court never explicitly articulates that the
choice to include aspiring states procedurally in these cases
is due to a need to preserve its normative legitimacy, its
jurisprudence coupled with scholarly analysis demonstrates
the centrality of this notion for the Court.
As described above, the aspiring state cases prompt a
new reading of the Court’s legitimacy and right to rule, but
beyond this, these cases also affect the legitimacy of the
aspiring states themselves. If one views these cases from the
constitutive theory of statehood, then without a doubt, the
recognition of a new state by other states is critical. Yet, even
those who adhere to the declarative theory of statehood must
acknowledge the importance of recognition by other states
from a political perspective. It would be impossible for an
aspiring state to qualify as a state under the declaratory
theory if it were entirely unable to meet the Montevideo
Convention’s requirement of engaging in relations with other
states, thus necessitating at least some level of recognition
from other states, even if one relies exclusively on the
declaratory theory.169 As a result, the Court’s choice to
legitimize aspiring states in the eyes of the international
167. See supra at p. 543.
168. Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 70, ¶ 131 (Apr. 1).
169. For a brief discussion of the constitutive and declaratory theories of state
recognition, see supra p. 505.
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community might lead to realization of the states’ vision of
statehood. One of the goals of any court is to confer legitimacy
on the norms and institutions that constitute the regime in
which they operate.170 Thus, the Court is engaged in regime
legitimization. As a result, “external legitimization [of
international governance] . . . constitute[s] one of the
ultimate ends of international [adjudication].”171 In the
aspiring state cases, the ICJ can be considered to be
conferring legitimacy on aspiring states by allowing them to
engage in the process at the ICJ. This conference of
legitimacy is evidenced throughout the discussion in Part III
of this Article, including the Court’s decision to allow aspiring
states such as Kosovo and Palestine to submit written and
oral statements in timeslots that position them as if they
were in contentious cases with their parent states as
adversaries.
In this regard, the expressive value of advisory opinions
for non-state actors is substantial with regard to the
legitimacy of aspiring states as they seek recognition within
the international community. Expressive value refers to the
value in a legal judgment above and beyond a court’s holding;
rather, a court’s treatment of actors procedurally and
substantively makes a statement more broadly, beyond the
legal holding itself.172 Certainly, had the Court’s holding
found unequivocally that aspiring states had the right to
exercise their right to self-determination, this would have
greatly affected their legitimacy much more than through
their inclusion. Yet, the mere fact of their inclusion is
procedurally important.

170. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107, 108-09 (2009).
171. Shany, supra note 145, at 265 (emphasis omitted).
172. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (defining “the expressive function of law [as] the
function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior
directly”). For discussion of the expressive value within the context of
international law mechanisms, see Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality,
Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 113-43 (2002).
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Historically, advisory opinions affect the norms by which
the international community interacts.173 As described by
Professor Nienke Grossman, “[a]dvisory opinions not only
shape political conditions but also contribute to the
development of international legal principles.”174 World
events have played out in such a way that the aspiring state
actors in many of these cases have effectively “won” their
advisory opinions at the ICJ. Clearly, an advisory opinion
does not declare a victor and a loser, yet if we understand the
Court’s procedural admittance of aspiring states as
positioning them as essential adversaries to the countries
from which they wished to secede, they have largely emerged
victorious in the court of world opinion. This pattern is
evidenced by Palestine’s ever-increasing recognition as a
state as it continues to bid for UN membership. On November
29, 2012, Palestine was accorded “non-member observer
state” status, which was an upgrade from its previous
position of “observer status.”175 Further, it has been accorded
the status of observer state by the ICC’s Assembly of State
Parties on December 8, 2014. It has also signed on to seven
of the nine core human rights treaties as of April 2014.176

173. As an example, a series of ICJ Advisory Opinions regarding the legality of
South Africa’s rule over Namibia culminated in a 1971 Advisory Opinion which
held that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that
South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw from Namibia. Further, it held
that no UN member state was to recognize as valid South African actions or
presence in Namibia, a territory that was at the time known as South-West
Africa. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa
in Nambia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Counsel Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 118-19 (June 21). These advisory opinions at the ICJ
were soon followed by the termination of the UN supervisory mandate that had
been in place since the end of the First World War, and the ultimate declaration
of independence of the sovereign state of Namibia in 1990.
174. Grossman, supra note 144, at 70.
175. G.A. Res. 67/19, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012).
176. See General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘NonMember Observer State’ Status in United Nations (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm; Rupert Colville, Press
Briefing Notes on Palestine for Spokesperson for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (May 2, 2014), http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/262AC5B8C25B364585257CCF006C010D (indicating that the
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The Kosovo advisory opinion has also undoubtedly
affected the legal and political reality with regard to Kosovo.
Although the Kosovo and Palestine cases and situations
cannot be equated directly to one another, and each aspiring
states’ bid toward statehood is developing daily, Kosovo has
also advanced in its aim toward achieving statehood. Kosovo
has been recognized as a state by 109 of 193 states of the
United Nations, and has begun to normalize relations with
Serbia through the 2013 signing of the Brussels Agreement,
in which the two nations agreed to normalized relations and
to refrain from attempting to inhibit progress in the other’s
attempts to join the European Union.177 Thus, although
neither Kosovo nor Palestine enjoys universal recognition by
UN member states, since the time at which the relevant
advisory opinions were adjudicated, they have each made
considerable progress toward recognition as states. Although
it is impossible to quantify the effect that an advisory opinion
might have on the perceived legitimacy of a state in its
attempts to seek international recognition, there does appear
to be a positive correlation between a “favorable” advisory
opinion from the ICJ and an increase in state recognition and
legitimacy in the global community.
Perhaps because the Court is so often perceived as an
artifice of the state-centered, old-world approach to
international law, its legitimacy is not subject to question
when it takes an unorthodox step such as the procedural
inclusion of NSAs. Despite criticism to the contrary, the ICJ
may actually be more progressive than it has been perceived
to be in this regard. Although procedural inclusion of aspiring
states may be a small step, the Court has used its rulemaking
authority to achieve the delicate balance required to
maintain its legitimacy from both ends of the spectrum, as
states and aspiring states are both relevant constituencies to
consider from a legitimacy perspective. It is doubtful that the
balance will tip anytime soon such that the Court would
“State of Palestine deposited with the Secretary-General its instruments of
accession to a number of international treaties”).
177. See Ban Welcomes ‘Landmark’ Agreement Between Serbia and Kosovo
Negotiators, UN NEWS CENTRE (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=44708&Cr=kosovo&Cr1#.VJ3BlUAOcNh.
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allow aspiring states to participate fully in contentious
cases178 or to modify the Statute to officially allow more broadbased participation from such entities.
As the Court endeavors to preserve its normative
legitimacy or its “right to rule,” with regard to the position of
aspiring states, it has arrived at a compromise position
between acceding entirely to a state-centric position or to one
that would give all aspiring states full access to the Court.
This solution may be an imperfect one, in that it lacks
statute-based authority, yet it is one that preserves the
Court’s legitimacy from the perspective of both its mandate
holders (states) and its entitlement holders (aspiring states).
Critics of the ICJ find the current approach to aspiring
states, the right to self-determination, and to human rights
disheartening. Yet these critics should be assuaged by the
evidence provided in the aspiring state cases that the Court
does not lag far behind current trends in these areas as it
may appear at first. These cases do not foretell the end of
state-centered international law. Indeed, only those statelike NSAs who hope to become players in the state-centered
vision of international law are able to gain access to the
Court, assuming they meet the criteria laid out above of being
under international sponsorship, qualify to realize their right
to self-determination, and do so through the advisory opinion
mechanism. That they are permitted to do so vis-à-vis the ICJ
reveals, if not the end of state-centered international law, an
international law that is willing to facilitate a role for these
NSAs gaining access to the international community.
CONCLUSION
Through the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence
described here, it is evident that the Court is treating
aspiring states in a quite different manner than it might have
two or three decades ago. If there exists a spectrum between
self-determination and sovereignty, the Court is shifting
more in the direction of respect for self-determination,
recognizing that it may not rely solely on states to enforce
human rights, including the right to self-determination.
178. See Paulus, supra note 33, at 1650 (indicating that states are still reticent
to support an initiative that allows non-state participation).
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Legitimacy of international law relies on representation,
yet at the International Court of Justice, the human right of
self-determination is adjudicated without consultation with
many of the parties who are affected by its decisions.
Revealing its state-centric roots, international law does not
provide for enforcement of the right to self-determination.
And reasonably so, considering that it clashes inherently
with the right to state sovereignty. The centrality of states as
actors lies at the heart of international law, and the capacity
of the individual to bring claims against the state lies at the
heart of international human rights law. Yet the human right
to self-determination creates an existential crisis for these
systems. By its very definition, the right to selfdetermination of peoples challenges the very existence of a
state by challenging its right to territorial sovereignty and
revealing the difficulty of locating an international legal body
where the right to self-determination can be adjudicated.
The treatment of aspiring states at the ICJ is in
fundamental tension with the Court’s Statute. According to
its Statute, these non-state actors play no specific role within
proceedings. Yet, during several instances in which the right
to self-determination is at issue, the court has allowed NSAs
a significant role in the proceedings. Thus, despite the
antiquated and state-centric nature of the statute of the ICJ
and the foundations of international law, the ICJ has done
procedurally what it is not yet ready to do substantively. As
such, the ICJ is carving out a space, tentative though it may
be, to recognize the critical role that aspiring states play in
the international law arena. This recognition of a non statecentric approach to international law, along with it the
centrality of the narrative of human rights and in particular,
the right to self-determination, reflect critical shifts within
the jurisprudence of this court and within public
international law more broadly.
This Article also provides a new observation with regard
to the Court in the light of numerous critiques lobbied
against it that it is entirely driven by state interests. Instead
of a Court that is entirely state-based, this analysis reveals
that the Court, concerned with the democratic legitimacy of
the institution, has used the flexibility of the advisory opinion
as a solution to the problem of lack of representation of
aspiring states at the ICJ. In the cases of aspiring states, the
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choice to allow process-engagement at the Court represents
a slow-moving solution. This solution is flawed, certainly. It
is ad hoc, it appears haphazard, and it is poorly documented.
Yet, this choice reveals that despite its state-reliant and
state-centric origins, and indeed, despite the original source
of its normative legitimacy, the Court is struggling to adapt
to a rapidly changing world. The principal judicial organ of
the United Nations lacks the agility to change course quickly
in the choppy waters of international law—but it is slowly
and carefully evolving to a changing world of international
law that is populated by a rich diversity of actors and no
longer dominated by states alone.

